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803 
THE PRAETORIANS: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. 
BORDER PATROL CHECKPOINTS FOLLOWING 
MARTINEZ-FUERTE 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose José needs a gallon of milk from the grocery store. He puts on 
his shoes and grabs his car keys and his wallet. The grocery store is 
located outside of town. José is aware of the inevitable: he’ll have to cross 
an immigration checkpoint located halfway between his house and the 
grocery store. Upon arriving at the checkpoint, José must declare his 
citizenship to an immigration officer. José tells the officer that he is a US 
Citizen. The officer, however, is skeptical; he asks José for 
documentation. José, befuddled, pulls out his driver’s license and presents 
it to the officer. The officer scoffs, informing José that his driver’s license 
does not prove his citizenship. Thereafter, the officer instructs José to pull 
over to the side for further inspection. José complies, and other officers 
inform José that they will search his vehicle. José, having nothing to hide, 
consents to the search. José waits while officers and a canine inspect his 
vehicle. He’s nervous; the canine is sniffing all sorts of things in his car. 
Perhaps it’s the scent of pizza in the rear seat, or perhaps it’s his dog’s hair 
spread all over the driver’s seat. An immigration officer approaches José, 
telling him that the canine sniffed marijuana in the vehicle. José can’t 
believe what he’s hearing. He can only imagine how much longer he’ll be 
detained at the checkpoint. Will officers tear up his vehicle and find 
nothing? Will officers delay him further? An officer eventually lets José 
go. His five-minute trip to the grocery store became a thirty-minute trip. 
Unfortunately for José, the grocery store closed the minute he left the 
checkpoint. José returns home, fearful and empty-handed. 
The Constitution applies to every person in the United States. It applies 
to every person regardless of race, citizenry, and immigration status. It 
certainly applies to individuals like José. Specifically, when a person 
travels within the United States, he or she can rest assured that in his or 
her travels, the Constitution will attach itself to each step he or she takes. 
This includes instances where a person crosses the border from Mexico, 
Canada, or elsewhere into the United States. But in recent times, it seems 
as if the Constitution is no longer recognized in some parts of the United 
States. Concealed by the cloud of an omnipotent and intrusive 
government, people like José find themselves having to prove their 
citizenship, defend their ethnicity, and routinely fold on exercising 
fundamental constitutional rights within the United States. These 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
804 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:803 
 
 
 
 
procedures occur within 100 miles of the international border. One then 
must truly ponder when exactly did we begin to shrug off constitutional 
protections that, presumably, apply within the United States.  
The answer leads us to the late seventies, when the Supreme Court held 
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte that the United States Customs and 
Border Protection (“Border Patrol,” or “CBP”) could constitutionally 
operate checkpoints within the United States for the purpose of conducting 
brief, routine questioning in order to verify a person’s citizenship and 
immigration status.
1
 The case was fueled by efforts to curtail the flow of 
undocumented immigrants into the United States from Mexico.
2
 Some of 
these undocumented immigrants came to the United States because of 
economic opportunities unavailable in Mexico.
3
 But throughout the thirty-
eight-year history since the Court’s holding, some argue that CBP 
routinely ignores, misunderstands, or continuously refuses to acknowledge 
the fact that the checkpoints were to be solely utilized for immigration 
inquiries.
4
  
In addition to preventing undocumented immigrants from entering the 
United States, the checkpoints “yield a far richer harvest—a cornucopia of 
contraband, particularly illegal drugs.”5 Moreover, checkpoints are utilized 
in other law enforcement functions, such as apprehending human 
traffickers
6
 and intercepting unregistered firearms.
7
 One can hypothesize 
 
 
 1. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). 
 2. Id. at 551 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)) (finding that 
approximately 10–12 million undocumented immigrants were in the United States). 
 3. Id. (citing United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1973)).  
 4. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION’S (CBP’S) 100-MILE 
RULE 1 (2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/14_9_15_cbp_ 
100-mile_ rule_final.pdf. 
 5. United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). For 
recurring examples, see Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., San Clemente Border Patrol 
Agents at Checkpoint Near $2M Mark in Seizures for the Week (Aug. 25, 2014); Press Release, U.S. 
Customs & Border Prot., Border Patrol Arrests Two Men on I-5 with $780K of Narcotics (Aug. 21, 
2014); Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., San Diego Border Patrol Agents Nab $600K of 
Drugs at Checkpoint (Aug. 18, 2014). 
 6. See, e.g., Border Patrol Agents Find 15 People at Checkpoint, THE MONITOR (Nov. 23, 
2015, 8:32 PM), http://www.themonitor.com/news/local/border-patrol-agents-find-people-at-checkpoint/ 
article_9a386abe-9253-11e5-ac86-e7d57d676250.html.  
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Approximately $18,000.00 in U.S. Currency Seized on or About 
Oct. 29, 2013 at the U.S. Border Patrol Checkpoint in Sierra Blanca, Tex., No. EP-14-CV-00129-FM, 
2015 WL 1003872, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2015) (firearm); US Border Patrol Checkpoint in Upstate 
NY Detains 17, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/ 
sep/25/us-border-patrol-checkpoint-in-upstate-ny-detains-/ (detaining individuals for weapons 
violations, among other things). But see Bob Ortega, Incidents at Border Patrol Checkpoints Spur 
Complaints, AZCENTRAL.COM (Feb. 1, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/ 
immigration/2015/01/30/teacher-legal-guns-triggers-cbp-checkpoint-incident/22634247/ (inspecting a 
woman with a registered firearm). 
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the endless law enforcement functions that checkpoints could serve 
outside the immigration context: perhaps apprehending inmates who break 
out of prison, catching notorious drug lords like “El Chapo” Guzman, or 
perhaps even preventing terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIS 
from committing gruesome acts against Americans.
8
 Thus, the checkpoints 
can pursue laudable objectives within the United States. 
This broader use of the checkpoints, however, “subverts the rationale 
of Martinez–Fuerte and turns a legitimate administrative search into a 
massive violation of the Fourth Amendment.”9 The underlying reasons the 
checkpoints are scrutinized are twofold. First, the “Martinez–Fuerte 
[court] approved immigration checkpoints for a very narrow purpose—
detecting, and thereby deterring, illegal immigrants.”10 Second, individuals 
have become frustrated by the undermining of fundamental constitutional 
protections that, presumably, apply within the United States.
11
 Individuals 
traveling through the checkpoints consist of US citizens, lawful permanent 
residents, and foreign travelers. Hispanics
12
 primarily take issue with the 
controversial language from Martinez-Fuerte, where the Court allowed 
CBP to use “Mexican ancestry” to interrogate, and potentially search, 
certain individuals.
13
 Non-Hispanics likewise take issue with the 
checkpoints because the procedures have opened the floodgates to 
harassment and abuse.
14
  
A “round-the-clock US Border Patrol presence at the checkpoints 
means that American citizens must endure inspection when they commute 
 
 
 8. For other law enforcement functions, see United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 936 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (child pornography); State v. Grijalva, No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0051, 2015 WL 686025, at *1 
(Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2015) (enforcing state DUI law). 
 9. Soyland, 3 F.3d at 1316 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 1318. 
 11. Such constitutional protections include the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” and the Fifth Amendment’s protection against “self-
incrimination,” commonly referred to as “the right to remain silent.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V. 
 12. I recognize that there are different names for Spanish-speaking groups such as Hispanics, 
Latinos, Chicanos, etc. For the sake of convenience, I solely use “Hispanics” throughout this Note with 
the exception of the discussion of Martinez-Fuerte, where the Supreme Court uses the label 
“Mexican,” and the discussion of the PHP Study, where the report uses the label “Latino.”  
 13. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976). 
 14. See, e.g., Curt Prendergast, ‘Are You Detaining Me?’ Citizens, Lawyers Question Legality of 
BP Vehicle Searches, NOGALES INT’L (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.nogales international.com/news/ 
are-you-detaining-me-citizens-lawyers-question-legality-of-bp/article_2053f0a8-3295-11e3-ade3-001a 
4bcf887a.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FRH2-87N2; Border Patrol Checkpoints Foiled by Drivers 
Asserting Their Rights (VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2013, 11:16 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2013/03/01/border-patrol-checkpoints_n_2789592.html. 
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to work or run errands.”15 Some individuals encounter checkpoints while 
on their way to the supermarket, a doctor’s appointment, or the bank.16 
Others claim that the checkpoints have negatively affected local 
communities’ economies, including the real estate market,17 tourism, 
shopping, and recreational activities.
18
 In fact, in certain places, there is no 
way to get out of town without encountering a checkpoint.
19
 Complaints 
range from allegations of “unnecessary delays, harassment and sometimes 
abuse at the checkpoint[s]”20 to allegations of “unconstitutional searches 
and seizures, excessive use of force, racial profiling, and other agent 
misconduct.”21 While these occurrences are infrequent, they are clear 
violations of the Constitution and should concern all of us.  
 
 
 15. Amy Lieberman, Arizona’s Checkpoint Rebellion, SLATE (July 20, 2014, 7:31 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/07/arizona_immigration_checkpoint_cr
iticism_border_patrol_harasses_people_and.html.  
 16. See Massoud Hayoun, US Nationals ‘Under Siege’; Citizen Dies at Border Patrol 
Checkpoint, ALJAZEERA AM. (Dec. 29, 2013, 8:45 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/ 
29/us-nationals-undersiegeamidsuspiciousborderpatrolcheckpointdeath.html; Fernanda Santos, Border 
Patrol Scrutiny Stirs Anger in Arizona Town, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/06/28/us/border-patrol-scrutiny-stirs-anger-in-arizona-town.html. Notably, celebrities such as 
Willie Nelson and Snoop Dogg have been arrested at a checkpoint for possessing marijuana. John 
Burnett, At ‘Checkpoint of the Stars,’ Texas Sheriff Takes a Pass on Pot Cases, NPR (Nov. 15, 2015, 
9:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/01/444780811/at-checkpoint-of-the-stars-texas-sheriff-takes-a-
pass-on-pot-cases. 
 17. See, e.g., JUDITH GANS, THE BORDER PATROL CHECKPOINT ON INTERSTATE 19 IN SOUTHERN 
ARIZONA: A CASE STUDY OF IMPACTS ON RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE PRICES 2 (2012), available at 
http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/ucpubs/gans_2012b.pdf (finding that real estate prices declined in 
communities near a checkpoint by an average of over $2700 in a three-month period).  
 18. See Joe Sharkey, Border Patrol Grows as Seizures Drop, ALJAZEERA AM. (Aug. 22, 2013, 
6:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/8/22/border-patrol-growingasapprehensions drop. 
html. 
 19. See id. In fact, thousands of undocumented immigrants, including those brought to the United 
States by their parents as minors, are limited from traveling since they will undoubtedly encounter a 
checkpoint. Manny Fernandez, Checkpoints Isolate Many Immigrants in Texas’ Rio Grande Valley, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/us/checkpoints-isolate-many-
immigrants-in-texas-rio-grande-valley.html?_r=0. 
 20. Cindy Carcamo, Arizona Residents Begin Monitoring Immigration Checkpoint, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 26, 2014, 6:58 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-border-crossing-20140227-story. 
html#axzz2uURn4Zzw. 
 21. Letter from James Lyall, Staff Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ariz., to Charles K. 
Edwards, Deputy Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Office of Inspector Gen. 1 (Jan. 15, 2014), 
available at http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20AZ%20Complaint%20re 
%20CBP%20Checkpoints%20%202014%2011%2015.pdf. For other instances involving physical 
altercations, see Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the Border Patrol Became America’s 
Most Out-of-Control Law Enforcement Agency, POLITICO MAG. (Nov./Dec. 2014), http://www. 
politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/border-patrol-the-green-monster-112220_full.html#.VGgQoZPF 
-6w; Tom Graser, No Charges for Border Patrol Agents for Stun Gun Use at Waddington Checkpoint, 
WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015, 5:23 PM), http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/news05/ 
no-criminal-charges-for-border-patrol-agents-who-used-stun-gun-at-waddington-checkpoint-video-20 
151207 (CBP agents allegedly used a stun gun on a woman at a checkpoint); J.J. Hensley, Tempe 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/9
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This Note proposes standards for checkpoint procedures that would 
strike an equilibrium between implementing effective law enforcement 
procedures at interior checkpoints and preserving constitutional values 
within the United States. This Note distinguishes CBP procedures 
conducted at the international border, which address compelling 
governmental interests in regulating foreign commerce and preserving 
national security, from CBP procedures not conducted at the international 
border that should be scrutinized much more stringently.
22
 
Thus, this discussion is broken down as follows. Part I provides a brief 
history of the checkpoints, including CBP’s organizational structure, its 
functions at the checkpoints and its authority for carrying out those 
functions, and the Supreme Court’s approval of checkpoints in Martinez-
Fuerte. Part II discusses the practical implications of Martinez-Fuerte, 
including how to prove US Citizenship at checkpoints, whether 
individuals may refuse to answer non-immigration related inquiries, and 
the dilemma over CBP not recording individual checkpoint statistics for 
law enforcement functions. Part III discusses the procedures and legal 
standards for specific actions that have potential damages claims for 
unlawful or improper conduct by CBP agents at checkpoints. Moreover, 
Part III discusses potential barriers one may face when seeking relief from 
the federal government and its officers for being subject to allegedly 
unlawful or improper conduct at checkpoints. Lastly, Part IV proposes 
several reforms that could determine whether the federal government has 
gained substantial benefits from checkpoint operations that outweigh the 
costs of operating the checkpoints. Reform efforts include implementing 
an ombudsman’s office for CBP, implementing an effective, accessible, 
and external complaint forum, and implementing a “SENTRI-like” 
program for local communities. Moreover, this Note argues that a 
 
 
Pastor Says Border Agents Stopped, Beat Him, ARIZ. REP. (Apr. 17, 2009, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/04/17/20090417.borderbeating0417-ON.html (CBP 
agents broke the car window of a gentleman at a secondary inspection and then tased him, which 
caused him to bleed); Morgan Loew, Immigration Checkpoints Catching More Drugs than People, 
CBS5 AZ (May 28, 2015, 8:52 AM), http://www.kpho.com/story/27331272/us-citizens-complaining-
about-immigration-checkpoints (CBP agents smashed the car window of a gentleman who refused to 
roll down his window at a checkpoint and chose to remain silent throughout the interrogation); 
Fernanda Santos, Border Patrol Accused of Profiling and Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/us/aclu-accuses-border-patrol-of-underreporting-civil-rights-
complaints.html.  
 22. This Note will not discuss the application of certain constitutional provisions at the 
international border. For a discussion delineating a person’s rights at the international border, see Jon 
Adams, Rights at United States Borders, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 353 (2005). 
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Supreme Court fix may clarify whether checkpoints can continue to be 
utilized the way they have been for almost four decades.  
I. HISTORY  
Following September 11, 2001, there was a “radical restructuring” of 
some federal agencies whose missions related to national security.
23
 The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”)24 consolidated several federal 
agencies into a single entity, the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”).25 Approximately twenty-two federal agencies, 185,000 federal 
government employees, and “countless specific functions were 
transferred” over to DHS.26 When Congress passed the HSA, it also 
divided the immigration functions of the DHS into two different entities: 
one responsible for the immigration enforcement function and the other 
responsible for the service function.
27
 Furthermore, the HSA authorized 
the president to modify the departmental structure; the president 
subsequently did so, further dividing the immigration functions of the 
DHS into three immigration agencies: two enforcement bureaus and one 
service bureau.
28
 The enforcement bureaus are the US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and CBP.29 These entities are responsible 
for interior enforcement and border enforcement, respectively.
30
 ICE is 
responsible for “investigations, intelligence-gathering, detention, certain 
elements of the deportation process, the registration of noncitizens, and 
other interior enforcement operations.”31 CBP, on the other hand, conducts 
border inspections at various locations, including land borders, airports, 
seaports, and interior checkpoints.
32
 This Note focuses solely on CBP 
operations at interior checkpoints.  
 
 
 23. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 
AND POLICY 2 (6th ed. 2015).  
 24. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 
U.S.C.).  
 25. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 23, at 2.   
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 3.  
 29. Id. For a discussion delineating the evolution of the CBP, see Graff, supra note 21; U.S. 
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SNAPSHOT: A SUMMARY OF CBP FACTS AND FIGURES 1 (2015), 
available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=763674.  
 30. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 23, at 3. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/9
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A. Checkpoint Procedures 101 
CBP plays a crucial role in curtailing illegal activity within the United 
States by operating interior checkpoints in areas reasonably located away 
from the international border.
33
 In 2009, CBP operated approximately 
seventy-one “permanent and tactical checkpoints on the southwest 
border.”34 Presently, CBP operates approximately 170 checkpoints on 
roads and highways within the United States.
35
 Since the United States 
shares a border with Mexico that is almost 2000 miles long, and much of 
the border area is “uninhabited desert or thinly populated arid land,”36 the 
checkpoints provide support in monitoring secondary roads CBP 
determines are likely to be used by undocumented immigrants or narcotics 
smugglers.
37
 Although CBP maintains personnel, electronic equipment, 
and fences along portions of the border, some individuals still find a way 
to enter the United States undetected.
38
 “It also is possible for an 
 
 
 33. CBP checkpoint operations are authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1357, which provides in relevant 
part:  
Any officer . . . shall have power without warrant— within a reasonable distance from any 
external boundary of the United States, to board and search for aliens any . . . vehicle . . . for 
the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United 
States. 
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2014). “Reasonable distance” is “100 air miles from any external boundary of 
the United States or any shorter distance which may be fixed by the chief patrol agent for CBP.” 8 
C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (2016); see also Matt Apuzzo & Michael S. Schmidt, U.S. to Continue Racial, 
Ethnic Profiling in Border Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/12/06/us/politics/obama-to-impose-racial-profiling-curbs-with-exceptions.html (“Federal agents 
have jurisdiction to enforce immigration laws within 100 miles of the borders, including the coastlines, 
an area that includes roughly a third of the United States, and nearly two-thirds of its population.”). 
For a visual depiction of this 100-mile zone in the United States, see Know Your Rights: The 
Government’s 100-Mile “Border” Zone-Map, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/ 
know-your-rights-governments-100-mile-border-zone-map (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). The U.S. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) established these regulations without any public comment or debate. 
See The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 34. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-824, CHECKPOINTS CONTRIBUTE TO 
BORDER PATROL’S MISSION, BUT MORE CONSISTENT DATA COLLECTION AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT COULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 34 n.44 (2009) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 35. See Bob Ortega, Some in Town to Monitor Border Patrol Checkpoint, ARIZ. REP. (Feb. 26, 
2014, 11:49 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20140225arizona-town-monitor-
border-patrol-checkpoint.html.  
 36. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976). 
 37. Cindy Casares, Border Patrol Takes ‘No’ for an Answer at Internal Checkpoints, TEX. 
OBSERVER (Mar. 7, 2013, 2:49 PM), http://www.texasobserver.org/border-patrol-takes-no-for-an-
answer-at-internal-checkpoints/. 
 38. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552. But see Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: 
Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy, 27 POPULATION & DEV. 
REV. 661, 669–76 (2001) (indicating that the substantial increase of CBP agents and surveillance along 
the Southwestern border resulted in a large increase in the death rate for persons crossing the border). 
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[undocumented immigrant] to enter unlawfully at a port of entry by the 
use of falsified papers.”39 “Once within the [United States], 
[undocumented immigrants] seek to travel inland to areas where 
employment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by 
prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers who transport them 
in private vehicles.”40 Thus, a CBP checkpoint is “akin to a Port of 
Entry.”41 
Given this context, CBP checkpoints “play a significant, strategic, and 
tactical role in the support of the National Border Patrol Strategy.”42 CBP 
currently operates a combination of permanent and tactical traffic 
checkpoints nationwide as part of a “three-tiered, defense-in-depth 
strategy” to secure the US Border between ports of entry.43 “This strategy 
involves the use of line-watch operations [at the international] border, 
roving patrol operations near the border,[
44
] and traffic checkpoints on 
highways leading away from the border.”45 CBP also conducts operations 
at “functional equivalents” to the international border; in other words, 
locations away from the international border.
46
 Functional equivalents 
operate similarly to an international border.  
 
 
In fact, since 1998, more than 6,000 migrants have died trying to cross the United States-Mexico 
border. INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, FATAL JOURNEYS: TRACKING LIVES LOST DURING MIGRATION 
12 (Tara Brian & Frank Laczko eds., 2014), available at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free 
/FatalJourneys_ CountingtheUncounted.pdf. 
 39. Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552. The checkpoints are also capable of apprehending 
individuals who overstay their visas. 
 40. Id. (citation omitted).  
 41. United States v. March., No. CR-13-02249-001-TUC-JGZ (BPV), 2014 WL 2584458, at *3 
(D. Ariz. June 10, 2014).  
 42. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL 
YEAR 2012 17 (2013), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/perform_ 
account_ rpt_2013_3.pdf [hereinafter “CBP REPORT”].  
 43.  Id. This may also include the use of “random” checkpoints. See, e.g., Moveable Border 
Patrol Checkpoints Showing Up in Laredo Area, KGNS.TV (Aug. 18, 2015, 10:52 PM), 
http://www.kgns.tv/home/headlines/Border-Patrol-322237502.html. 
 44. This Note will not discuss the constitutional basis for roving CBP stops. For a discussion 
involving roving patrol stops, see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
 45. CBP REPORT, supra note 42, at 17. Congress authorizes CBP operations. For example, “[a]ny 
officer . . . shall have power without warrant—to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien 
as to his right to be or to remain in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (2014).  
 46. CBP agents may “stop, search, and examine . . . any vehicle . . . he or they shall suspect there 
is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any 
manner contrary to law.” 19 U.S.C. § 482(a) (2014). CBP agents may also examine “documents and 
papers and examine, inspect, and search the . . . vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, 
package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all 
necessary force to compel compliance.” 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2014). 
 Border Patrol’s strategy must be explored further. Suppose Border Patrol apprehends 99% of 
unlawful activity at the international border. With that figure, however, 1% of unlawful activity is 
getting past the international border (presumably, because of human error or some other conceivable 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/9
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To visualize the checkpoint procedures, each step can be broken down 
as follows. In most cases, once a motorist arrives at a checkpoint, he or she 
will very likely be allowed to travel freely “without any oral inquiry or 
close visual examination.”47 Only in a relatively small number of instances 
will a CBP agent conduct further inquiry into a motorist’s immigration 
status.
48
 Usually based on “suspicious circumstances,” a CBP agent will 
direct a motorist to a secondary inspection area.
49
 Once at secondary, a 
CBP agent may search a vehicle so long as there is probable cause or the 
motorist consents
50
 to the search.
51
 In construing what can meet the 
probable cause standard, an agent may use his or her discretion in 
conducting a search of the vehicle, but this discretion is usually 
corroborated by a canine on site alerting the agent to the possible presence 
of narcotics in a vehicle.
52
 Moreover, “probable cause,” in the immigration 
 
 
factor, such as the sheer difficulty of policing such a long border). Thereafter, we must determine 
whether checkpoints, roving patrols, or other mechanisms are preventing that 1% from continuing to 
travel within the United States. Suppose, 0.5% of unlawful activity is being prevented (for the same 
reasons mentioned previously). That still leaves Border Patrol with 0.5% of unlawful activity 
mobilizing outside the 100-mile border zone. Given that “perfect” figures amounting to 100% may be 
unrealistic, questions remain whether Border Patrol is in fact as effective in only allowing 0.5% of 
unlawful activity into the United States, whether we are comfortable with that figure, and whether that 
result is because of primary inspections at the international border or secondary inspections at 
checkpoints (through deterrence and other tactics). This empirical research will be addressed in a later 
paper. 
 47. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 546 (1976).  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. The plain view doctrine states that a point officer is limited to a visual inspection of a 
vehicle (i.e. what can be seen without a search). Id. at 558. However, certain characteristics of a 
vehicle may justify suspicion. For example, whether the vehicle is a certain make or model, whether 
the vehicle appears to be heavily loaded, whether the vehicle contains an extraordinary number of 
persons, or whether the vehicle contains persons trying to hide are all relevant factors. Id. at 575 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). For further articulations of “suspicious circumstances,” see United States v. 
Sanders, 937 F.2d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir. 1991) (“In construing what ‘suspicious circumstances’ means, 
courts should recognize there is no single or narrow definition available to answer all scenarios. 
Accordingly, some deference is properly given to border patrol agents who, as law enforcement 
officers, are specifically trained to look for indicia of crime, with an emphasis on immigration and 
customs laws. So long as their interrogation bears a reasonable relationship to their unique duties, the 
judiciary is properly reluctant to interfere, and a reviewing court should only determine whether the 
suspicious circumstances as perceived by the border patrol agent are supported by the facts.”). 
 50. Consent must be “knowingly and voluntarily given, and must not be the product of 
coercion.” United States v. Ruiz-Perez, No. CR-11-0561-TUC-DCB-DTF, 2011 WL 7639543, at *5 
(D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2011) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)), report and 
recommendation adopted as modified, No. CR-11-561-TUC-JGZ, 2012 WL 1078887 (D. Ariz. Mar. 
30, 2012). Furthermore, even after consenting to a search, one is free to “delimit or withdraw his or her 
consent at anytime.” Id. at *6 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 252 (1990)). An unlawful 
detention may revoke consent. United States v. Jaime, 473 F.3d 178, 182 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 51. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 567 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975)). 
 52. This procedure, collectively, is sufficient to overcome the “probable cause” standard at 
checkpoints. See, e.g., United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that probable cause is supplied when a dog alerts a CBP agent to a particular vehicle); United States v. 
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context, is the “reasonable belief, based on the circumstances, that an 
immigration violation or crime has likely occurred.”53 
There is no formula as to what factors an agent may use to detain 
someone; detention should, theoretically, be temporary and scrutinized on 
a case-by-case basis.
54
 The detention will likely conclude only after a CBP 
agent is satisfied with the immigration statuses of the individuals in the 
vehicle and there are no circumstances that raise suspicion regarding the 
presence of illegal substances.
55
 But these encounters may not always be 
“brief” or “temporary.” As checkpoints have proliferated, the question of 
whether some encounters run afoul of constitutional protections under the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments has quietly arisen.
56
 What we know for 
certain is that “[o]nce a vehicle crosses the border, the fourth amendment 
applies in full force, regardless of the fact that the Border Patrol is 
authorized by statute to stop and search any vehicle within a 100 mile 
border zone.”57 But these fundamental constitutional provisions seem to 
be, at times, watered down by numerous exceptions intended to carry out 
compelling law enforcement practices at checkpoints. The following 
section explores CBP’s authority to operate checkpoints within the United 
States and how the Supreme Court blessed this authority with its holding 
in Martinez-Fuerte.  
 
 
Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995) (hinging reliability on the canine’s training and certification); 
United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 393–94 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 
22, 27 (7th Cir. 1980) (same); cf. JAMES LYALL ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ARIZ., 
RECORD OF ABUSE: LAWLESSNESS AND IMPUNITY IN BORDER PATROL’S INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT 
OPERATIONS 2 (2015), available at http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/Record_of 
_Abuse_101515_0.pdf (noting that canine alerts can be false alarms).  
 53. The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, supra note 33.  
 54. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 567. 
 55. In summary, one court has described the entire encounter as follows:  
A “routine checkpoint stop,” which must be brief and unintrusive, generally involves 
questions concerning the motorist’s citizenship or immigration status, and a request for 
documentation. A cursory visual inspection of the vehicle is also routine, and a few brief 
questions concerning such things as vehicle ownership, cargo, destination, and travel plans 
may be appropriate if reasonably related to the agent’s duty to prevent the unauthorized entry 
of individuals into this country and to prevent the smuggling of contraband. 
United States v. Morales, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1263 n.4 (D.N.M. 2007) (citing United States v. 
Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1993)); see also Adams, supra note 22, at 366 n.89 (citing 
United States v. Massie, 65 F.3d 843 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that CBP agents at a checkpoint may 
briefly question motorists about cargo, destination, and travel plans, so long as such questions are 
reasonably related to the agent’s duty to prevent either unauthorized entry or smuggling)).  
 56. Casares, supra note 37. 
 57. Mary H. Rose, Comment, Illegal Aliens and the Border Patrol—Reasonable Suspicion Not 
Required When Occupants of Vehicles Stopped for Questioning at Permanent Inland Checkpoints: 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 9 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 303, 313 (1976). 
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B. Jurisprudential Roots: United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 
Without discussing the facts of Martinez-Fuerte in great length, the 
Court granted certiorari to the petitioners in order to resolve a circuit split 
over the constitutionality of the checkpoint procedures.
58
 The Court 
consolidated several cases where the defendants had all been convicted of 
illegally transporting undocumented immigrants. One circuit found the 
procedures to be reasonable while another circuit found the procedures to 
be unreasonable.
59
 The Court analyzed the checkpoint operations under the 
umbrella of the compelling governmental interest in regulating 
undocumented immigration.
60
 In the Court’s writings, this interest could 
only be furthered by upholding the use of interior checkpoints because the 
ever-increasing size of border traffic could not be controlled effectively at 
the international border.
61
 The Court was comfortable tipping the scales in 
favor of upholding checkpoints as it believed such operations imposed a 
de minimis intrusion on an individual’s privacy.62 
At the time the case came to the Court on appeal, approximately ten 
million cars passed some checkpoints annually.
63
 The San Clemente 
Checkpoint in San Clemente, California, was one of these checkpoints, 
and was also one of the subject checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte. In 1973, 
approximately 17,000 undocumented immigrants were apprehended at the 
San Clemente Checkpoint.
64
 Given these numbers, it is unlikely that the 
Court was sympathetic to the respondents’ arguments that CBP agents had 
violated their constitutional rights at the checkpoints. In fact, the named 
respondent, Amado Martinez-Fuerte, produced identification that proved 
his immigration status, but his passengers, who were undocumented 
immigrants, admitted to entering the United States unlawfully.
65
 The Court 
probably brushed aside these arguments when it was abundantly clear that 
 
 
 58. Case Comment, Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—Immigration Checkpoint Stops for 
Questioning Are Reasonable Without Individualized Suspicion—United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543 (1976), 2 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 125, 125 (1978). 
 59. Id. at 125–26. 
 60. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). 
 61. Id. at 556. 
 62. Id. at 563. 
 63. Id. at 554.  
 64. Id. In an eight-day period the following year, roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the 
same checkpoint and 820 vehicles were referred to secondary inspection, which resulted in the 
discovery of 725 deportable aliens in 171 vehicles. Id. 
 65. Id. at 547. 
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the respondents had knowingly violated US immigration laws by 
transporting undocumented immigrants within the United States.
66
  
Martinez-Fuerte brought to the forefront the legal framework CBP 
heavily relies on in conducting its operations at checkpoints on a day-to-
day basis.
67
 The majority of the Court’s discussion revolved around the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment at the checkpoints. The Court 
recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s protections from “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” imposed limits on CBP from what otherwise would 
be “arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials” with an 
individual’s privacy interests.68 In conducting its Fourth Amendment 
analysis, the Court weighed the public’s legitimate interest in having 
checkpoints to regulate immigration against an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests.
69
 The Court erred with the former, noting that 
checkpoint procedures minimally interfered with the Fourth Amendment
70
 
and did not completely undermine an individual’s right to “free passage 
without interruption.”71  
The Court believed that the checkpoints served significant law 
enforcement functions in the immigration context. First, the Court 
distinguished checkpoint operations from roving patrol stops. Unlike 
motorists that are pulled over during a roving patrol stop, motorists using 
major highways are not “taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain 
knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped 
elsewhere.”72 Moreover, since CBP agents may stop only the vehicles 
passing through the checkpoint, the Court reasoned that there is less room 
for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than a roving patrol stop.
73
 
The Court recognized that these safeguards ensured that CBP agents were 
not equipped with arbitrary law enforcement discretion.  
Second, the Court doubted that CBP administrators would locate a 
checkpoint where the procedures bear “arbitrarily or oppressively on 
motorists as a class.”74 The Court reasoned that the choice of checkpoint 
 
 
 66. See id. at 548, 550.  
 67. Id. at 562–68. 
 68. Id. at 554. The Court noted “checkpoint stops are ‘seizures’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 556. 
 69. Id. at 562. 
 70. Id. at 555, 559.  
 71. Id. at 557–58 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)). “The Martinez-
Fuerte court recognized the right to freedom of movement but minimized its importance.” Rose, supra 
note 57, at 318 n.78. 
 72. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559. 
 73. Id. at 561–62.  
 74. Id. at 559. 
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locations was an administrative decision that had to be left largely within 
CBP’s discretion.75 This implies that the Court was reluctant to interfere 
with an arm of the executive branch. Third, the Court found no 
constitutional barrier in CBP selectively referring motorists to the 
secondary inspection area based on “apparent Mexican ancestry.”76 The 
Court reiterated that CBP officers must have wide discretion in selecting 
motorists to inquire briefly about their citizenship or immigration status.
77
 
Overall, the majority found that governmental interests in providing 
discretion to law enforcement officials to effectively perform their jobs 
outweighed an individual’s privacy interests.78 
Justice William Brennan heavily criticized the majority’s rationale.79 
First, he warned that “[e]very American citizen of Mexican ancestry and 
every Mexican alien lawfully in this country must know after today’s 
decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at [his or her own] 
risk.”80 I highly doubt a non-Mexican individual would be burdened with 
such a risk during his or her travels. Second, Justice Brennan noted that an 
individual, “whose conduct has been nothing but innocent . . . surely 
resents his own detention and inspection.”81 Checkpoints “detain 
thousands of motorists, a dragnet-like procedure offensive to the 
sensibilities of free citizens.”82 Justice Brennan believed that the delay 
occasioned by stopping hundreds of vehicles on a busy highway would be 
“particularly irritating.”83 Surely, a non-Mexican individual would be 
delayed far less than a Mexican individual.  
Justice Brennan noted that a Mexican-appearing motorist travels a 
highway with a checkpoint “at the risk of being subjected not only to a 
stop, but also to detention and interrogation, both prolonged and to an 
extent far more than for non-Mexican appearing motorists.”84 The Court’s 
holding opened the door for certain motorists “[t]o be singled out for 
 
 
 75. Id. at 562 n.15. 
 76. Id. at 563.  
 77. Id. at 563–64. 
 78. Id. at 561. The Court believed that enhanced CBP discretion was vital for effective law 
enforcement. Id. at 562 n.15. 
 79. Justice Brennan’s dissent was one of five written in the October 1976 term. See Summary of 
Actions Taken by the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1976, at L+39 (on file with author). 
 80. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 571.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 572. 
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referral and to be detained and interrogated” in an arbitrary manner.85 
Many of Justice Brennan’s fears surfaced following the decision.86 
II. REPERCUSSIONS POST-MARTINEZ-FUERTE 
The Court’s decision in Martinez-Fuente raised fundamental questions. 
First, how is a US Citizen supposed to prove his or her citizenship? 
Second, is an individual obligated to cooperate with a CBP agent at a 
checkpoint when that agent’s “brief inquiry” exceeds that of an 
immigration-related administrative interrogation? In the absence of a 
solution articulated by Congress or the Supreme Court, scholars, 
journalists, and others have attempted to provide answers to these 
unanswered questions. Third, have the checkpoints been effective in 
achieving broader law enforcement roles, and do those roles fit within the 
Martinez-Fuerte framework?  
A. Proving Citizenship and the “Mexican Ancestry” Criterion 
All motorists, both Mexican-appearing and non-Mexican appearing, 
have to answer the same question: “Are you a US citizen?”87 The Court 
did not articulate how a US Citizen must prove his or her citizenship when 
traveling within the United States. This ambiguity raises a secondary 
question of whether local residents are required to carry documentation to 
verify their residency when they are only usually obligated to do so when 
traveling outside of the country and then seeking re-entry. Documentation 
is technically not required at a CBP checkpoint unless the vehicle contains 
lawful permanent residents, who are required to carry their alien 
registration cards (“green cards”) “at all times.”88 And for foreign visitors, 
most, if not all, have their visas or passports readily available. However, 
most US Citizens do not carry their birth certificates, passports, social 
security cards, or naturalization certificates on their person. While the 
majority of US Citizens carry their driver’s license on their person, this 
form of identification may be deemed insufficient to prove citizenship at 
checkpoints.
89
 Thus, proving citizenship is mind-bogglingly difficult. 
 
 
 85. Id.  
 86. For a list of complaints alleging abuse at checkpoints in Arizona, see generally LYALL ET AL., 
supra note 52, at 6–7, 19–25. 
 87. See Sharkey, supra note 18.  
 88. 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (2014).  
 89. See, e.g., Sepulveda v. United States, No. 12-cv-3008-W BGS, 2014 WL 145233, at *1 (S.D. 
Cal. Jan. 10, 2014). 
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This documentation requirement particularly revolves around the 
Court’s “Mexican ancestry” criterion as a basis for CBP to interrogate, and 
potentially search, some individuals.
90
 CBP wields a “license to profile” at 
the checkpoints.
91
 The criterion is difficult to implement without blatantly 
profiling an individual on the basis of their physical appearance; some US 
Citizens and documented immigrants easily fall into the broad “Mexican 
ancestry” criterion. In fact, some cabinet members in the Obama 
administration could very well fall into this category. Simply put, the fact 
that it is impossible to prove one’s US citizenship without carrying 
specialized documentation makes the requirement of proving one’s 
citizenship problematic. Basically, asking a US Citizen to prove his or her 
citizenship, and that US Citizen not being able to, and thereafter allowing 
the agent to further interrogate and/or search said individual on the mere 
basis of his or her ethnicity is quite the conundrum. To then add a further 
layer of difficulty by singling out individuals by ethnicity when no one 
else would face a similar burden is unconscionable. So while the use of the 
“Mexican ancestry” criterion serves the underlying goal of apprehending 
undocumented immigrants, the broad net cast by the Court inadvertently 
 
 
 90. The Court’s criterion is not free of criticism. See, e.g., United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 
142 F.3d 1217, 1223 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[A] person’s racial characteristics are insufficient to establish 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify detention after a checkpoint stop conducted a substantial 
distance from the Mexican border.”); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(demonstrating the impracticality of using “Mexican [ancestry]” as a factor in detaining an individual 
because “[i]t is impossible to determine from looking at a person of Mexican descent whether he is an 
American citizen, a Mexican national with proper entry papers, or a Mexican alien without papers”); 
Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 
675, 677–78 (2000) (footnote omitted) (“Race-based enforcement deserves special scrutiny because it 
disproportionately burdens persons of Latin American ancestry in the United States,  the vast majority 
of whom are U.S. citizens or lawful immigrants. Generally speaking, whether they are U.S. citizens, 
lawful immigrants, or undocumented aliens, persons of Latin American ancestry or appearance are 
more likely than other persons in the United States to be stopped and interrogated about their 
immigration status.”).  
 91. For arguments in favor of and against using race as a criterion for effective enforcement of 
immigration laws, see generally Renata Ann Gowie, Driving While Mexican: Why the Supreme Court 
Must Reexamine United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 233, 252 
(2001) (emphasizing that Brignoni-Ponce’s precedential effect is “untenable” due to the increased 
Hispanic presence in the southwestern United States); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in 
America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States 
and the Need For Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1009 (2010) (“[T]o truly root out 
racial profiling from modern law enforcement, the law must impose limits on the consideration of race 
in law enforcement, restrict law enforcement discretion in making stops, and afford a meaningful 
remedy for impermissible stops and arrests.”). But see Kristin Connor, Note, Updating Brignoni-
Ponce: A Critical Analysis of Race-Based Immigration Enforcement, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 567, 619 (2008) (concluding that the consideration of race in law enforcement practices as one 
of many factors is appropriate given the public interest in enforcing immigration laws). 
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covers other individuals and leads to unintended consequences of 
harassment and abuse. 
But others defend the “Mexican ancestry” criterion because it is viewed 
as the only effective way to stop undocumented immigration. Some argue 
that the “Mexican ancestry” criterion is essential in pursuing law 
enforcement goals because CBP agents “have [a] very short period of time 
to make an assessment as to whether further inquiry needs to be given.”92 
Given CBP’s short time frame, the “Mexican ancestry” criterion is 
reasonable in light of the fact that some undocumented immigrants coming 
from the southern border are Mexicans. It is conceivable that CBP agents, 
like others, have biases, which are most likely activated in situations 
requiring an agent to make a split-second judgment. In Martinez-Fuerte, 
the Court explicitly allowed these implicit biases to be used in determining 
who is subject to Fourth Amendment violations. Another reason behind 
not implementing a more lagged procedure at checkpoint interrogations is 
that such a procedure may be impractical. The flow of traffic varies by 
region, but those regions with much heavier traffic are likely to implement 
procedures that are much more expeditious than their counterparts.  
In multiple recent law enforcement contexts, questions have been 
raised about the legality of law enforcement procedures that either 
explicitly or implicitly rely on racial profiling. Such procedures have been 
heavily scrutinized. In 2014, the Obama Administration issued new rules 
curtailing the use of profiling in federal law enforcement procedures.
93
 The 
new rules impose new training requirements that would require federal 
agents to keep records on complaints they receive about profiling, 
presumably including CBP agents located at checkpoints.
94
 Moreover, the 
new rules offer more protection against discrimination than that required 
by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.95 But the new 
rules did not go as far as advocates hoped; they exempt federal agents 
from the prohibition on considering race and ethnicity when stopping 
people at airports, border crossings, and immigration checkpoints.
96
 Thus, 
 
 
 92. Apuzzo & Schmidt, supra note 33 (noting that DHS officials argue that ignoring ethnicity in 
border enforcement procedures is “impractical”); see also Adams, supra note 22, at 361 (noting that a 
CBP agent may “routinely search people he would not have routinely searched solely because of their 
race or ethnicity”); Connor, supra note 91, at 619–20 (concluding that considerations of racial 
appearance may be appropriate). 
 93. Apuzzo & Schmidt, supra note 33.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
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even with the new rules, US citizens who appear to be of Mexican 
ancestry will continue to struggle to comply with checkpoint procedures.  
B. Refusing to Answer Non-Immigration Questions 
In Martinez-Fuerte and its progeny, the Court has failed to address 
whether a motorist may refuse to answer a CBP agent’s questions—
primarily those that go beyond the scope of a routine immigration inquiry. 
This scenario arises in the instance where CBP agents ask questions that 
go beyond verifying a motorist’s residency, which changes the line of 
questioning from an administrative one to a law enforcement one. One 
federal circuit has held that checkpoint stops ought to be “limited to the 
justifying programmatic purpose of the stop: determining the citizenship 
status of persons passing through the checkpoint.”97 This means the stop is 
restricted to “the time necessary to ascertain the number and identity of the 
occupants of the vehicle, inquire about citizenship status, request 
identification or other proof of citizenship, and request consent to extend 
the detention.”98  
One justice did consider whether motorists could refuse to answer non-
immigration related questions. At oral argument in the Martinez-Fuerte 
case, Justice Thurgood Marshall asked both sides whether a motorist could 
leave a checkpoint freely after verifying his or her citizenship or 
immigration status.
99
 Both sides could not answer this question, and the 
Supreme Court did not address the question in its opinion. Today, 
however, commentators, government officials, and legal scholars seem to 
be a lot more certain regarding whether or not individuals may refuse to 
cooperate with CBP.  
For instance, one commentator notes that law-abiding citizens may not 
be detained for refusing to listen to or cooperate with an immigration 
officer, presumably including at a CBP checkpoint.
100
 In another instance, 
a CBP spokesman said a motorist can refuse to answer questions, but will 
not be allowed to proceed until his or her citizenship or immigration status 
is verified.
101
 Furthermore, one court was faced with this question, but 
 
 
 97. United States v. Machuca–Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 433 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Oral Argument at 8:38, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (No. 74-
1560), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1560.  
 100. See Henry G. Watkins, The Fourth Amendment and the INS: An Update on Locating the 
Undocumented and a Discussion on Judicial Avoidance of Race-Based Investigative Targeting in 
Constitutional Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 540 (1991). 
 101. See Casares, supra note 37. 
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held, for different reasons, that a referral to secondary inspection was 
valid.
102
 Moreover, Ms. Denise Gilman, Co-Director of the Immigration 
Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law, said that “[CBP] agents 
at inter[ior] checkpoints are allowed to ask motorists basic questions about 
citizenship, identity and travel itinerary, but they cannot detain you or 
search your vehicle without probable cause. Your refusal to answer 
questions would not provide probable cause to allow for such a detention 
or search . . . .”103  
In order to further interrogate a motorist past the initial interrogation 
phase, CBP agents need (1) probable cause that an immigration law has 
been violated or (2) the driver’s consent to a search of his or her vehicle. 
With respect to the latter, one court noted that a driver may refrain from 
consenting to a search, and thereafter is allowed to leave without 
consequence.
104
  
While the Court in Martinez-Fuerte ruled solely on the application of 
the Fourth Amendment at checkpoints, a future case could implicate the 
protections of the Fifth Amendment—particularly, the protection against 
self-incrimination. The role of the Fifth Amendment at checkpoints, 
especially in the context of refusing to cooperate with CBP, brings to the 
forefront the difference between routine immigration inquiries and broader 
law enforcement inquiries.
105
  
For starters, the Court noted that individuals are theoretically “seized” 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment during the initial inquiry.
106
 Thus, 
an individual may not leave until a CBP agent allows it. In fact, driving 
away from a checkpoint without CBP’s consent is a felony.107 Given this, 
one can argue that an individual is in custody and thus Fifth Amendment 
protections apply. This then begs the question of whether CBP agents 
must administer Miranda warnings to detained individuals at 
 
 
 102. United States v. March., No. CR-13-02249-001-TUC-JGZ (BPV), 2014 WL 2584458, at *2 
(D. Ariz. June 10, 2014) (noting that the CBP agent in the specific case referred the motorist to 
secondary inspection for “suspicious circumstances,” such as nervousness, that he noticed before the 
motorist refused a search of his vehicle).  
 103. Casares, supra note 37 (quoting Denise Gilman, Co-Director of the Immigration Clinic at the 
University of Texas School of Law). 
 104. See United States v. Vasquez-Gutierrez, No. 2:14-CR-793-1, 2015 WL 429735, at *1 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 2, 2015). 
 105. See Adams, supra note 22, at 367 n.93 (citing United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 899 
(11th Cir. 1982) (holding that the routine questioning of individuals wishing to enter the United States 
does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination)).  
 106. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976). 
 107. See 18 U.S.C. § 758 (2014); Patrik Jonsson, Borderland Protests: Do Border Patrol 
Checkpoints Go Too Far?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
USA/Justice/2015/0421/Borderland-protests-Do-Border-Patrol-checkpoints-go-too-far.  
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checkpoints.
108
 With respect to broader law enforcement uses, “[i]f the 
initial, routine questioning [at a checkpoint] generates reasonable 
suspicion of other criminal activity, the stop may be lengthened to 
accommodate its new justification.”109 Certainly, “an investigatory stop is 
not an arrest”; however, the detainee’s right to roam freely “is as restricted 
as if he were temporarily placed under arrest [because] [t]he seizure of his 
person is equally against his will and equally complete,” and because “an 
attempt to avoid stopping would lead to pursuit by the Border Patrol, and 
presumably would amount to probable cause to arrest and to search the 
vehicle.”110  
Information obtained at a checkpoint stop would usually be used for 
deportation proceedings. Deportations, however, are not criminal 
proceedings and thus defendants in such cases are not entitled to the 
protections against self-incrimination arising out of the Fifth 
Amendment.
111
 The Fifth Amendment could, however, apply in a scenario 
where CBP’s questions went beyond the immigration context. Examples 
include those where an agent asks whether a motorist is transporting 
contraband or undocumented immigrants. Answering this question could 
potentially result in revealing self-incriminating evidence.
112
 One may 
doubt, however, that an agent would be so blunt in his or her interrogation, 
or similarly that an individual would be so forthright in answering such a 
question. Nonetheless, such questioning could be considered “verbal 
searches” that entitle an individual to constitutional protections.113 While 
the Court clearly discussed the constitutionality of the checkpoint 
operations through a Fourth Amendment lens, it remains a mystery what 
other constitutional protections apply at checkpoints since the Constitution 
applies with full force within the United States.   
 
 
 108. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Adams, supra note 22, at 369 n.108 
(citing United States v. Estrada-Lucas, 651 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that Miranda 
protections are triggered at a border inspection when an individual “reasonably believe[s]” he is not 
free to leave the inspection)), with Adams, supra note 22, at 369 n.102 (citing United States v. Tai-
Hsing, 738 F. Supp. 389, 393 (D. Or. 1990) (holding that a Miranda warning is unnecessary during a 
routine immigration inspection where the individual is referred to a secondary search)). 
 109. United States v. Machuca–Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 434 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 110. Rose, supra note 57, at 318 (footnote omitted). 
 111. Id. at 319. 
 112. Id. at 320. 
 113. Id. 
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C. Recording Individual Checkpoint Data 
Checkpoints “remain a critical piece of infrastructure and a highly 
effective tool in [the] enforcement efforts to secure [the] nation’s 
borders.”114 In fiscal year 2013, CBP agents at checkpoints were 
responsible for seizing over 340,000 pounds of marijuana, which was 14% 
of the 2.4 million pounds of marijuana confiscated by CBP agents along 
the northern and southern borders.
115
 Moreover, in the past four fiscal 
years combined, CBP checkpoints were responsible for intercepting more 
than half of the heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine seized overall in 
that same period.
116
 The checkpoints have also proven invaluable for 
preventing undocumented immigrants from entering the United States. In 
fiscal year 2012, CBP enforcement at checkpoint operations nationwide 
accounted for the apprehension of over 7500 individuals, which 
represented 2% of CBP’s total apprehensions.117 In the same year, CBP 
also referred over 1800 cases to the US Attorney’s office.118  
But while CBP’s achievements are highly commendable, a crucial 
point must be made. The Court in Martinez-Fuerte was motivated by a 
desire to curtail the flow of undocumented immigrants into the United 
States from Mexico.
119
 The Court barely made any mention of using the 
 
 
 114. Carcamo, supra note 20. But see LESLEY SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
APPREHENSIONS BY THE U.S. BORDER PATROL: 2005–2010 1 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-apprehensions-fs-2005-2010.pdf (indicating that the 
apprehension of undocumented immigrants declined by 61% from 2005 to 2010).  
 115. Santos, supra note 16. Additionally, in fiscal year 2012, CBP agents seized narcotics almost 
5000 times at the checkpoints, which was 33% of CBP’s total narcotics seizures that year. CBP 
REPORT, supra note 42, at 18.   
 116. Santos, supra note 16.  
 117. CBP REPORT, supra note 42, at 18. For a brief look at CBP’s total apprehension of 
undocumented immigrants coming from Mexico spanning from 2000 to 2013, see U.S. BORDER 
PATROL, ILLEGAL APPREHENSIONS FROM MEXICO BY FISCAL YEAR 2, available at http://www.cbp. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%20Apprehension%2
0Statistics%20by%20sector%20and%20border%20area.pdf (demonstrating that the total number of 
apprehensions of undocumented immigrants coming from Mexico has substantially declined); see also 
LYALL ET AL., supra note 52, at 3, 14 (noting that in 2013, nine out of twenty-three checkpoints 
located in the Tucson Sector “produced zero arrests of ‘deportable subjects’”); Astrid Galvan, Border 
Patrol Makes Few Immigrant Arrests at Checkpoints, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 15, 2015, 5:15 PM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1353cc04f84d4cca80fa128f7d526935/border-patrol-makes-few-immigrant-
arrests-checkpoints (“[O]nly about 800 of the 120,939 immigrant apprehensions made by the Border 
Patrol in the Tucson Sector in fiscal year 2013 were made at checkpoints. That’s 0.67 percent.”).  
 118. CBP REPORT, supra note 42, at 18.  
 119. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552–53 (1976) (citing United States v. 
Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 405, 407 n.2 (S.D. Cal. 1973)). 
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checkpoints to primarily seize narcotics,
120
 which, according to the 
statistics, has overwhelmingly been CBP’s greatest success. 
But there are no statistics documenting the success or failures of CBP’s 
use of expanded law enforcement functions at checkpoints. CBP only 
records statistics for the checkpoints by sector.
121
 CBP does not disclose 
“stop data or other information related to interior enforcement operations”; 
thus, “what little is publicly known has been revealed through FOIA 
[“Freedom of Information Act”] requests and litigation.”122 The lack of 
individual statistics makes it more difficult to determine whether one 
specific checkpoint provides a net benefit that outweighs the cost of 
maintaining the specific checkpoint. To this point, the Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”), Congress’ auditor, has delineated 
numerous issues with CBP’s “internal monitoring of checkpoint 
operations, including ‘information gaps and reporting issues [that] have 
hindered public accountability, and inconsistent data collection and entry 
[that] have hindered management’s ability to monitor the need for program 
improvement.’”123 Some litigants have alleged that failing to disclose 
certain CBP documents may violate the FOIA and impede “efforts to 
educate the public on the many questions that remain regarding the full 
extent and impact of wide-ranging interior enforcement operations 
conducted by the largest law enforcement agency in the country.”124  
Due to this lack of transparency, outside groups have taken the 
initiative and begun to record individual checkpoint statistics. In 2014, 
People Helping People in the Border Zone (“PHP”), a humanitarian group 
based in Arivaca, Arizona, monitored a checkpoint located in its town. For 
three months,
125
 PHP monitors recorded several pieces of information 
during their observations, including: (1) vehicle descriptions; (2) motorist 
descriptions; (3) the duration of each stop; (4) what occurred during the 
stop, such as whether individuals were asked for identification or referred 
 
 
 120. See id. at 556–57 (mentioning briefly that checkpoints force drug smugglers to use secondary 
roads).  
 121. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 34. Even then, CBP formally records traffic stops 
only when an arrest is made. See LYALL ET AL., supra note 52, at 2; Howard Fischer Capitol Media 
Services, Drivers Abused at Border Patrol Checkpoints, ACLU Says, TUCSON.COM (Oct. 15, 2015, 
7:10 PM), http://tucson.com/news/local/border/drivers-abused-at-border-patrol-checkpoints-aclu-says/ 
article_4b4e32a2-fae2-54b6-8641-d2d40437cd0c.html.  
 122. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 5, Ariz. Civil Liberties Union Found. of Ariz. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 4:14-cv-02052-CRP (D. Ariz. Apr. 28, 2014), 2014 WL 1673277; see 
also LYALL ET AL., supra note 52, at 11 (recognizing inadequate data collection). 
 123. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 122, at 5 (alteration in original) (quoting GAO 
REPORT, supra note 34, at 28).  
 124. Id. at 6.  
 125. Checkpoint monitors ended their studying in late April due to climate concerns. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
824 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:803 
 
 
 
 
to a secondary inspection; (5) the use of service canines; (6) the CBP 
agents’ identity; and (7) the vehicle occupants’ gender, age, and 
ethnicity.
126
 After monitoring over 2000 vehicles, PHP concluded that 
CBP agents engaged in unlawful practices at the checkpoint by the 
“systemic racial profiling of Latino motorists.”127  
The PHP Study made several findings to support its conclusion. First, 
of the vehicles used in the study, 1938 were occupied by “White-only” 
occupants while 210 were occupied by “Latino-only” occupants.128 
Applying PHP’s methodology to this figure, CBP agents were “[twenty-
six] times more likely” to ask a Latino-occupied vehicle to demonstrate 
immigration documents for verification than a “White-occupied 
vehicle.”129 Second, CBP agents were “[twenty] times more likely” to 
order a Latino-occupied vehicle to secondary inspection.
130
 Lastly, after 
observing over 2000 vehicles, including those that were referred to 
secondary inspection, the PHP Study found that CBP had not apprehended 
a single individual, citizen or non-citizen, and CBP seized no 
contraband.
131
 But what is truly the most fundamental takeaway from the 
PHP Study is that it provides the public with information CBP has not 
provided: individual checkpoint statistics.  
CBP could emulate the PHP Study by tracking individual checkpoint 
statistics. Doing so would provide CBP with enough information to 
conduct a full cost-benefit analysis to determine which locations are the 
most feasible for future checkpoint operations. A cost-benefit analysis 
would also allow CBP to carefully scrutinize which current checkpoints 
fall behind in performance standards. This is the precise recommendation 
the GAO has made in the past.
132
 As the Court noted in Martinez-Fuerte, 
 
 
 126. PEOPLE HELPING PEOPLE, COMMUNITY REPORT: CAMPAIGN DOCUMENTS SYSTEMIC RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION AT ARIZONA BORDER PATROL CHECKPOINT 2 (2014), available at http://phparivaca. 
org/?p=567 [hereinafter “PHP STUDY”]. One caveat to the PHP Study is that the monitors, faced with 
the threat of arrest, had to make their observations from a distance well outside the CBP inspection 
area, thus impairing a full ability to observe or listen to the CBP agents’ procedures. Id at 1. 
Nonetheless, the monitors collected their data to the best of their ability. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 2. According to the PHP Study, while other classifications were considered, only these 
two categories were used in analyses. Id. at 3. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 4. This finding can go both ways: either the checkpoints have effectively mitigated 
narcotics transportation in the Arivaca area for approximately two months, or that in fact the 
checkpoint is simply a nuisance to the residents in the area.  
 132. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-435, AVAILABLE DATA ON 
INTERIOR CHECKPOINTS SUGGEST DIFFERENCES IN SECTOR PERFORMANCE 8 (2005) (“Border Patrol 
does not routinely maintain data on the costs of operating checkpoints.”). 
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CBP is unlikely to place a checkpoint in an area where it “bears arbitrarily 
or oppressively on motorists as a class.”133 Using the people of Arivaca as 
an example, the checkpoint there is certainly oppressive to Hispanics in 
the study. Unaccounted for checkpoint operations may cause Hispanics to 
leave the area, and perhaps deter Hispanics from living in or visiting 
Arivaca. A pilot program intended to individually monitor checkpoints 
and report the specific checkpoints’ successes and failures would be a 
reasonable compromise that both recognizes checkpoints’ utility in some 
areas and moves toward a more transparent government.
134
 
III. REDRESSABILITY POST-MARTINEZ-FUERTE 
“[A] claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or 
operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial 
review.”135 This language, uttered by the Supreme Court in Martinez-
Fuerte, was presumably addressing Justice Brennan’s concerns.136 If an 
individual is subject to harassment and abuse at the checkpoints, or if CBP 
violated an individual’s constitutional rights,137 that person can seek legal 
or injunctive relief through the courts. The person can find further relief 
through non-judicial avenues, such as filing a complaint with CBP against 
an individual officer.
138
  
 
 
 133. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976).  
 134. See Santos, supra note 16; see also JEFFREY JENKINS ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR BORDER SEC. 
AND IMMIGR., UNIV. OF ARIZ., CHECKING ON CHECKPOINTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. BORDER 
PATROL CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS, PERFORMANCE, AND IMPACTS (2014), available at http://borders. 
arizona.edu/cms/sites/default/files/checking-on-checkpoints_2014-09-09.pdf (addressing the 
recommendations made by the GAO in its 2009 report); R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, CBP, Remarks 
at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.: The Way Forward: Vision and Strategy 2020 (Apr. 
8, 2015), available at, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/speeches-and-statements/2015-04-08-000000/ 
way-forward-vision-and-strategy-2020 (“I am taking steps to make transparency and accountability 
hallmarks of my tenure at CBP. The public’s trust in us depends on it.”). 
 135. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559. 
 136. See id. at 567–78 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 137. For an insightful discussion about available judicial remedies for constitutional violations, 
see generally Watkins, supra note 100 (noting that individuals who are harassed by government 
officials during an immigration inquiry may have a cause of action against such government officials). 
 138. While the majority of this section will cover judicial remedies, a few words about non-
judicial remedies are necessary. Generally, a driver, his or her occupants, or “any other interested 
party” can file a complaint against a border patrol agent after misconduct at a checkpoint. See Bill Ong 
Hing, Border Patrol Abuse: Evaluating Complaint Procedures Available to Victims, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 757, 765–66 (1995). Complaints may be initiated through CBP personally, or, in the case of 
Mexican nationals traveling on the interstate, through the Mexican consulate. Id. Theoretically, 
complaints should be forwarded to the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), a subdivision of the 
DOJ. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.10(a) (1993)). Thereafter, “the matter could die at the OIG, end up in 
the hands of the Civil Rights Division of the [DOJ] for criminal civil rights prosecution, or go to the 
INS’s Office of Internal Audit and the Border Patrol supervisor of the agent for meting out 
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A. Judicial Relief 
There are two types of judicial remedies: equitable relief and 
damages.
139
 With respect to the former, individuals who wish to halt 
certain CBP actions can do so through an injunction, assuming they have 
standing in federal court.
140
 Some have requested injunctive relief from 
CBP, alleging that its agents violated their First Amendment rights at a 
checkpoint.
141
 Similarly, one may seek injunctive relief in the form of a 
request that CBP comply with existing federal law. For instance, plaintiffs 
sought injunctive relief when CBP allegedly failed to furnish public 
information requested through FOIA.
142
 The Supreme Court has 
traditionally allowed actions against federal officers who are “allegedly 
acting in excess of their legal authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional 
statute.”143 Thus, seeking injunctive relief may halt unconstitutional 
 
 
administrative punishment.” Id. (citing Interview with John Chase, Chief, Office of Internal Affairs, 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 12, 1995)). In 2015, the ACLU of Arizona 
found that for fiscal years 2012 through 2013, DHS oversight agencies, including the OIG, reported 
only three complaints alleging Fourth Amendment violations, nationwide. LYALL ET AL., supra note 
52, at 2, 9. However, discovery produced in litigation between the ACLU of Arizona and DHS 
revealed eighty-one complaints from just two CBP sectors located in Arizona. Id. Moreover, while an 
available complaint forum is highly commendable, the forum has its downsides. For instance, the 
public is unaware of the ability to complain about abuse, a common issue in the border region. Hing, 
supra, at 779. “The problem is exacerbated by the fact that most of the victims and many of the 
witnesses are aliens who are not literate in English and are unfamiliar with U.S. laws and customs.” Id. 
(citing FRONTIER INJUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ALONG THE U.S. BORDER WITH MEXICO 
PERSIST AMONG CLIMATE OF IMPUNITY 31 (1993)). Additionally, there is no system in place for 
providing status updates regarding a particular complaint. Id. at 780–81. But even more problematic is 
persuading individuals to make complaints in the first place. For instance, many potential 
complainants are discouraged from reporting abusive practices because they fear retaliation “in the 
form of deportation, criminal charges, or loss of legal immigration status for themselves or family 
members.” Id. at 782 (quoting Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 496 (W.D. Tex. 1992)).  
 139. Distinguishable from merely filing an administrative complaint, only the driver of a vehicle 
at a checkpoint is likely to have standing in an action against a CBP agent. A passenger does not have 
a possessory interest in a car and therefore has no standing to assert that a search of the car is unlawful. 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978). 
 140. Individuals need not worry about CBP agents raising affirmative defenses such as qualified 
immunity in equitable actions such as injunctive relief as the defense only applies in suits for damages. 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 546 (5th ed. 2007) (citing authorities). 
 141. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief for Violation of Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment Rights, Jacobson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 4:14-cv-02485-BGM (D. Ariz. 
Nov. 20, 2014), 2014 WL 6530042. For another example, see Jamie Warren, Man Sues Border Patrol, 
Claims Harassment Over Medical Pot, KVIA.COM (Dec. 3, 2015, 7:45 PM), http://www.kvia. 
com/news/deming-man-files-lawsuit-to-prevent-seizure-of-medical-marijuana-at-border-patrol-check 
points/36779566 (requesting relief enjoining CBP from questioning US citizens about medical 
marijuana in states where it has been legalized).  
 142. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 122, at 2.  
 143. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 633 (listing authorities). 
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government actions.
144
 If, however, the federal officer is acting within the 
terms of his or her authority, and the complainant has not alleged that the 
action is unconstitutional, then injunctive relief is unavailable regardless 
of the allegedly wrongful conduct.
145
  
But most federal judges are unlikely to grant injunctive relief, 
especially when there is an adequate remedy at law. Thus, assuming 
federal judges err on the side of not granting injunctive relief, individuals 
are more likely to successfully receive relief by pursuing remedies under 
Bivens and/or the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”). Federal judges are 
more likely to grant these remedies. 
1. Bivens Relief 
Bivens
146
 relief is a judicially created remedy.
147
 Bivens dealt with 
damages actions against federal officials for constitutional violations.
148
 
Bivens relief became available after the Supreme Court refused to rely on 
state common law causes of action in tort to remedy constitutional 
violations.
149
 In the checkpoint context, a plaintiff could file for Bivens 
relief when he or she is referred to secondary inspection and a CBP agent 
searches his or her vehicle without probable cause or consent, which 
would run counter to the Fourth Amendment.
150
 But the Supreme Court 
suggested that Bivens relief is unavailable in two situations. First, there is 
no cause of action if there are “special factors counseling hesitation in the 
 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971); see also Nathaniel Saylor, Note, The Untouchables: Protections from Liability for Border 
Searches Conducted by U.S. Customs in Light of the Passage of the Good Faith Defense in 19 U.S.C. 
§ 482(b), 37 IND. L. REV. 275, 277 (2003).  
 147. While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes actions against state and local officers for civil rights 
violations, federal officers may be sued under Bivens or the FTCA for similar civil rights violations. 
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 605 n.1 (citing Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 (1963) 
(holding that federal officers are not liable under § 1983)). Federal officers, however, may be sued 
under § 1983 when “they act in concert with state or local officers” in violating one’s civil rights. Id. 
(citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 83 (1967)).  
 148. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 733 (6th ed. 2009). Prior to Bivens, “[n]o federal statute authorize[d] federal courts 
to hear suits or give relief against federal officers who violate[d] the Constitution of the United States.” 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 605. There also was no “analogous statute pertaining to violations 
of federal law by federal officials.” Id.  
 149. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 609 (“[I]ndividuals whose rights have been violated 
should not be relegated to state law remedies, which might be inadequate or hostile to the federal 
constitutional interest.”). 
 150. In fact, the plaintiff in Bivens alleged a Fourth Amendment violation after federal agents, 
without a warrant, stormed into his house in search of narcotics. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397–98.  
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absence of affirmative action by Congress.”151 The Court did not elaborate 
as to what would constitute “special factors” in future cases. Second, the 
Court suggested that there is no cause of action against federal officials in 
their individual capacity if Congress has explicitly provided an “equally 
effective” mechanism for redress.152 
Bivens relief is also heavily contested. For instance, while the Court 
explicitly created Bivens relief for damages against federal officers for 
violations of the Fourth Amendment, it has subsequently recognized 
existing causes of action for infringements of the Fifth Amendment.
153
 It is 
unclear if Bivens applies to checkpoint violations of the Fifth Amendment. 
Some lower federal courts have recognized Bivens relief for violations of 
the Fifth Amendment.
154
 The issue, however, is that these cases dealt more 
with alleged violations of the Due Process clause within the Fifth 
Amendment as applied to the federal government, not alleged violations of 
the Fifth Amendment’s so called “right to remain silent” as this Note 
posits. But Bivens relief may not be available depending on one’s 
immigration status. In a recent case of first impression, one federal circuit 
determined that undocumented immigrants arrested and detained for civil 
immigration enforcement actions may not bring Bivens actions against the 
arresting CBP agents.
155
 
“In more recent years, the rate of success—either through litigated 
judgments or monetary settlements—has been estimated at below two 
percent.”156 Furthermore, Bivens relief is, arguably, ineffective. Between 
1971 and 1985, litigants filed approximately 12,000 Bivens actions, but 
only four litigants obtained judgments that were not reversed on appeal.
157
 
Other legal scholars, however, have reached a different conclusion 
regarding the effectiveness of Bivens actions.
158
 Additionally, it is 
impractical for many potential plaintiffs to file for Bivens relief. For 
instance, the harm a motorist suffers at a secondary checkpoint varies. 
 
 
 151. Id. at 396. 
 152. Id. at 397. 
 153. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979).  
 154. See, e.g., Kwoun v. Se. Mo. Prof’l Standards Review Org., 622 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Mo. 
1985). 
 155. See De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 371 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 156. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 30 (3d 
ed. 2007) (citing Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public 
Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65 (1999)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its 
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813 (2010) (noting that 
“Bivens cases are much more successful than has been assumed by the legal community”). Professor 
Reinert found success rates, including settlements, ranging from 16% to more than 40%. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/9
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While a CBP agent’s unlawful search of a vehicle constitutes an illegal 
trespass, the plaintiff can only claim nominal damages without actual 
property damage.
159
 Many attorneys would be unwilling to take such a 
case to court, deeming it not cost effective.
160
 An additional problem is 
that some motorists may be unable to procure an attorney, due to lack of 
both funds and knowledge of where to even locate an attorney. Litigants 
that attempt to go to court in a pro se capacity are unlikely to stand a 
chance against the federal government in court. These litigants will have to 
“navigate statutory schemes that can be complex and confusing and are 
not always gap-free.”161 
2. FTCA Relief 
In addition to Bivens relief, litigants can also seek relief from the 
federal government under the FTCA.
162
 The FTCA establishes exclusive 
federal district court jurisdiction and waives sovereign immunity in actions 
against the United States:  
[F]or injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused 
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
Government while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with 
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
163
  
A claim under the FTCA is different from an ordinary tort action. 
Specifically, an action under the FTCA may not be filed unless the 
claimant has “first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency” 
and the agency has failed “to make final disposition of a claim within six 
 
 
 159. But see Adams, supra note 22, at 355 n.11 (citing United States v. Bews, 715 F. Supp. 1206, 
1211 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation when CBP agents searched a person’s 
travel bag even after the person gave legitimate reasons for his visit)). 
 160. The Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980 (“EAJA”), however, authorizes a court to award 
attorney’s fees to a party who prevails against the United States in court, unless the government’s 
position was “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d)(1)(A) (2014). For success stories, see 
Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing attorney’s fees to be awarded); cf. 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 628 n.120 (listing authorities that did not allow attorney’s fees to be 
awarded).  
 161. FALLON ET AL., supra note 148, at 866. 
 162. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 646, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346). 
 163. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2014); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW 
OF FEDERAL COURTS 127–28, 134–35 (6th ed. 2002). 
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months.”164 Tortious actions such as unlawful detention and property 
damage are included under the FTCA.
165
 But of particular significance to 
potential litigants in the context of the FTCA is an exemption of liability 
for the United States for most intentional torts. For example, the FTCA 
states that the federal courts are denied jurisdiction over claims such as 
assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment.
166
 In 1974, however, 
the FTCA was amended to permit recovery against the United States for 
these torts when committed by federal law enforcement officers.
167
 The 
modification, among other things, came as a result of instances where 
federal narcotics agents were engaging in “illegal behavior,” and many 
individuals were unjustly left without relief.
168
 
There are some key distinctions between Bivens actions and relief 
under the FTCA.
169
 First, Bivens actions are designed to address 
constitutional violations whereas the FTCA is designed to address tort 
claims and state civil rights claims.
170
 Second, Bivens actions may be 
solely brought against federal agents acting in their official capacity under 
color of federal law.
171
 By contrast, the FTCA is a statutory remedy where 
the United States waives sovereign immunity and a litigant may sue the 
United States.
172
 Third, the statute of limitations for a Bivens action is 
based on the forum state’s statute of limitations for a personal injury 
action.
173
 The FTCA, on the other hand, requires litigants to exhaust an 
administrative remedy within two years of the alleged misconduct.
174
 If the 
administrative claim is denied, litigants have six months to file an action 
seeking judicial relief.
175
  
 
 
 164. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2014). Relief under the FTCA is limited solely to money damages, with 
the exception of punitive damages, which the FTCA prohibits. FALLON ET AL., supra note 148, at 862. 
However, punitive damages and jury trials are available under Bivens. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 
14, 22 (1980). 
 165. See Saylor, supra note 146, at 277–78.  
 166. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2014); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 638. 
 167. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 638.  
 168. Id. 
 169. For an in-depth discussion delineating these distinctions, see Phillip Hwang, Suing 
Government Officials for Damages, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 459, 464 
(2009). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. In fact, the most frequent litigant in the courts of the United States is the United States. 
See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 163, at 127 n.2 (finding that the United States is a party in more than 
one-quarter of the civil cases in the district courts). For the rise and decline of civil rights litigation, see 
id. at 134–35. 
 173. Hwang, supra note 169, at 464.  
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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With respect to damages and attorney’s fees, Bivens claims do not have 
a cap on damages so long as FTCA claims are not simultaneously alleged 
in the complaint.
176
 On the other hand, the FTCA places a 20% cap on 
damages if the case is settled administratively (i.e., litigants cannot recover 
more than 20% of the total settlement reached), and 25% if resolved after 
the filing of a court case (i.e., litigants cannot recover more than 25% of 
the total judgment awarded).
177
 Moreover, attorney’s fees are unavailable 
in Bivens actions, but are possibly available under a different statutory 
scheme such as the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), so long as the 
federal government acted in bad faith in ordering certain CBP conduct.
178
  
B. Qualified Immunity and Other Barriers to Relief 
Both Bivens relief and FTCA relief have shortcomings.
179
 For one, 
“[m]any civil rights cases have been dismissed by federal and state courts 
based on qualified immunity.”180 “Qualified immunity protects public 
officers from suit if their conduct does not violate any ‘clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.’”181 Upon raising a qualified immunity defense, litigants suing the 
individual officers bear the burden of showing that the agents violated a 
known constitutional right, and such constitutional right was “clearly 
established” at the time of the incident.182 A constitutional right is clearly 
established if it “would [have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his 
 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. EAJA relief is available in administrative and judicial proceedings. See generally 5 
U.S.C. § 504 (2014) (administrative); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2014) (judicial). Other distinctions include 
that jury trials are available in Bivens actions but not in FTCA actions, and CBP agents may claim 
qualified immunity in Bivens actions and the “discretionary function exception” in FTCA actions. 
Hwang, supra note 169, at 464. 
 179. For a list of exceptions to the FTCA, see Saylor, supra note 146, at 278–81. For our 
purposes, two exceptions warrant attention. First, there is the “discretionary function exception,” 
which excludes any claim “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the 
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” FALLON ET AL., supra note 148, at 
862 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)). Second, there is the “due care in implementing invalid statutes and 
regulations exception,” which excludes claims “based upon the action of a government employee 
‘exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not . . . valid.’” Id. at 863.  
 180. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 554. Officers must raise qualified immunity as an 
affirmative defense or else risk waiver. See id. at 546; Saylor, supra note 146, at 284. 
 181. Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201, 224 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 182. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
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conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”183 Qualified 
immunity applies unless both prongs are satisfied.
184
 
1. Practical Complications 
Additionally, both Bivens relief and relief under the FTCA are 
litigation-only remedies. Litigation is expensive, so a litigant will have to 
factor in a substantial amount of money in attorney’s fees and costs in 
weighing a decision to file or not file suit. Moreover, in the FTCA cases, 
the United States is the defendant, and the likelihood of success against the 
government in such cases is low. Truly then, the majority in Martinez-
Fuerte did not foresee the practical barriers an individual may face when 
seeking relief after an unlawful checkpoint stop. This undermines a crucial 
factor in the Court’s holding in Martinez-Fuerte: that the courts would be 
accessible to the aggrieved.  
There are considerations that make these judicial remedies ineffective. 
In addition to potentially not being able to afford an attorney, some 
complainants may face a language barrier, preventing them from filing a 
complaint, judicial or non-judicial. Others may also be unlikely to have the 
necessary information available to make a formal complaint against a CBP 
official who violates his or her constitutional rights.
185
 Furthermore, it is 
debatable as to whether relief under the FTCA precludes relief under 
Bivens, meaning that litigants are not entitled to double recovery against 
the federal government.
186
 Moreover, the FTCA’s jurisdiction does not 
extend to constitutional violations since a private party would not be liable 
 
 
 183. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
640 (1987). 
 184. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.  
 185. See generally Hing, supra note 138 (raising such issues). 
 186. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2014); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 
1994) (holding that a litigant who pursues remedies under Bivens and the FTCA can receive both only 
if the former judgment is entered first); Serra v. Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 242 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986) (holding that double recovery is not allowed); Ortiz v. Pearson, 88 F. 
Supp. 2d 151, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he FTCA expressly bars a plaintiff from recovering damages 
against an employee of the government after securing final judgment on an FTCA claim arising out of 
the same facts.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 616 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 
(1980)) (concluding that “Bivens suits [are] a ‘counterpart’ to the [FTCA] because the [FTCA] creates 
liability for the federal government and a Bivens cause of action permits recovery from the officers,” 
thus allowing double recovery). Professor Erwin Chemerinsky hypothesizes that the FTCA imposes an 
election of remedies: suit cannot be brought against both the United States under the FTCA and 
against the individual employee under a Bivens cause of action. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 
637. 
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absent a violation of “conduct under the color of law.”187 In FTCA cases, 
the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for torts arising out of the act or 
omission of a federal government officer who acts within the scope of his 
or her employment,
188
 except for Bivens actions. If the US Attorney 
General notes that a federal employee was acting within the scope of 
employment “at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose,” the 
employee is granted immunity from suit, the United States is substituted 
for the employee, and the action proceeds as one against the United 
States.
189
 Individuals should consider all of these practical considerations 
before filing a complaint.  
2. Good Faith Immunity 
Federal officers, such as CBP agents, may also be protected by the 
statutorily authorized “good faith” immunity.190 The “good faith” standard 
will usually be dispositive of whether a certain litigant can recover against 
a federal officer.
191
 The “good faith” standard “must strike a balance 
between protecting the officer’s exercise of discretion, while still 
compensating and deterring violations of federal law.”192 The key 
difference between qualified immunity and good faith immunity is the 
particular standard applied. That is, qualified immunity is an objective 
standard while good faith immunity is a subjective standard.
193
 It is also 
safe to say that the standard for both doctrines is significantly different for 
claims arising out of allegations of racial profiling at CBP checkpoints.
194
 
In such situations, claimants have to prove that the actions taken by CBP 
agents “had a discriminatory effect, and were motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.”195 Moreover, “[i]n order to prove discriminatory 
 
 
 187. JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 156, at 24 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994) 
(“[T]he United States simply has not rendered itself liable under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort 
claims.”)). 
 188. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2014). 
 189. Id. § 2679(d)(2). 
 190. 19 U.S.C. § 482(b) (2014). For an enlightening analysis of the good faith immunity doctrine 
at the time of its enactment, see Saylor, supra note 146, at 292–98 (noting that “good faith” could 
apply based on an official’s reliance on operating procedures, departmental procedures, supervisory 
instructions, and regulations). 
 191. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 546. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Saylor, supra note 146, at 291–92 (citing Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 
2000)). 
 194. See Adams, supra note 22, at 360 (noting that at the international border, searches are 
invalid if “motivated by consideration of race, for the purpose of delay, or a manifestation of ill-will”).  
 195. Saylor, supra note 146, at 299 (citing Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 204–05 (3d 
Cir. 2002)). 
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effect[,] the claimant has the burden of showing that he or she is a member 
of a protected class and that he or she was treated differently from 
similarly situated individuals in an unprotected class.”196 Thus, absent 
direct evidence or compelling circumstantial evidence of discriminatory 
purpose, such a standard is unlikely to be satisfied, and a CBP agent will 
not be liable.
197
 This immunity would arise in situations where individuals 
claim they were discriminated against for their Hispanic appearance.  
So while the majority in Martinez-Fuerte dismissed Justice Brennan’s 
concerns by noting that the “courts would not be powerless to prevent the 
misuse of checkpoints to harass those of Mexican ancestry,”198 individuals 
do, in fact, face substantial barriers in seeking relief following an improper 
checkpoint stop.  
IV. REFORM POST-MARTINEZ-FUERTE 
Given the foregoing discussion, several proposals may assist in 
reaching a balance between implementing effective law enforcement 
procedures at checkpoints and preserving fundamental constitutional 
protections. To be clear, this Note only proposes solutions to improve 
these checkpoints’ effectiveness by imposing an oversight factor that has 
been lacking since their inception. Such proposals arise in the context of 
previous legislation introduced in 2014 intended to oversee CBP’s 
operations, including those at the checkpoints.
199
 This same piece of 
legislation, House Bill 4303, also promised to make CBP more inclusive 
with border communities.
200
 House Bill 4303 died in committee when the 
114th Congress was introduced in 2015. Congress could reintroduce 
House Bill 4303, but the new legislation must acknowledge proposals the 
original bill did not.
201
  
 
 
 196. Id. (citing Bradley, 299 F.3d at 206). Realistically, however, should a motorist choose not to 
pursue judicial avenues for relief, the CBP agent who allegedly engaged in misconduct will continue 
to be employed and may subsequently engage in similar conduct. See id. at 299–300; see also Hing, 
supra note 138, at 773–74.  
 197. Nonetheless, some have been successful against CBP outside of litigation. See Apuzzo & 
Schmidt, supra note 33 (noting that in 2013, CBP settled “a racial-profiling lawsuit in which 
Washington State residents accused border agents of racial profiling while making traffic stops near 
the Canadian border”).  
 198. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 n.19 (1976). 
 199. Border Enforcement Accountability, Oversight, and Community Engagement Act of 2014, 
H.R. 4303, § 3(a), 113th Cong. (2014), available at https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr4303/ 
BILLS-113hr4303ih.pdf.  
 200. Id. § 452(d)(3).  
 201. Two brief solutions that warrant further consideration are (1) “know your rights” booths near 
checkpoints and (2) “Border Patrol Academies” for the general public. See Press Release, Am. Civil 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/9
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A. CBP Ombudsman Proposal 
House Bill 4303 proposed creating an Ombudsman to monitor 
checkpoint operations. In 2014, Border Patrol conducted operations at 136 
stations, 5 substations, and 35 permanent checkpoints, all within 20 
sectors.
202
 These numbers did not account for temporary or “tactical” 
checkpoints operated in these same sectors. The Ombudsman’s primary 
duty would be to record statistics on individual checkpoints and compile a 
report to determine the cost-effectiveness of the checkpoints. “Costs” go 
beyond those that are merely tangible; they include intangible costs such 
as the loss of inclusivity and community, a loss of respect for the 
Constitution, and a biased implementation of selective law enforcement 
procedures on a certain group of individuals. The cost-benefit tool can be 
broken down into several inquiries. First, the Ombudsman would analyze 
CBP’s budget from DHS. In fiscal year 2014, CBP received an annual 
budget of $13.9 billion.
203
 Thereafter, the Ombudsman could determine 
how much money each checkpoint sector received and in turn how much 
money went to funding individual checkpoints in each sector. Clearly 
then, one solution is for the Ombudsman to request and monitor how much 
is being spent at each checkpoint by sector to determine costs.
204
  
Substantively, the Ombudsman could track law enforcement statistics 
by focusing on the following key questions, each split by three categories: 
(1) by sector, (2) at permanent checkpoints, and (3) at temporary 
checkpoints. First, what is the annually recorded number of undocumented 
 
 
Liberties Union of Ariz., ACLU of New Mexico Deploys a “Know Your Rights Checkpoint” (Mar. 18, 
2014); Curt Prendergast, Day 2 at the Academy: I-19 Checkpoint Duty, NOGALES INT’L (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nogalesinternational.com/news/day-at-the-academy-i--checkpoint-duty/article_12088a8a-
8db3-11e3-8fd3-001a4bcf887a.html. 
 202. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, supra note 29, at 1. 
 203. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2014 2 (2015), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP_ 
DHS_2014%20PAR_508C.PDF. Take for example operations conducted in the Southwest sectors, 
including Tucson, San Diego, and the Rio Grande Valley—locations with the highest activity. In fiscal 
year 2014, the Southwest Sectors staffed a total of 18,156 CBP employees. UNITED STATES BORDER 
PATROL, SECTOR PROFILE: FISCAL YEAR 2014 1, 4 (2015). The Southwest Sectors also apprehended a 
total of almost 480,000 undocumented immigrants of Mexican ancestry, both juveniles and adults. Id. 
The Southwest Sectors also intercepted a combined total of over 1.9 million pounds of Marijuana and 
Cocaine, 9205 ounces of Heroin, and 3771 pounds of Methamphetamine. Id. 92,000 of those cases 
were actually prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s office. Id. Additionally, the Southwest Sectors 
intercepted 475 firearms, which were, presumably, unregistered, over 63,000 rounds of ammunition, 
and just under $7.4 million in currency. Id. at 4. With these statistics already available to the public, it 
is simply a matter of keeping tabs on individual checkpoints when reporting statistical data.  
 204. See LYALL ET AL., supra note 52, at 17 (recommending a cost-benefit analysis to be 
conducted on the checkpoints). Even current CBP commissioner R. Gil Kerlikowske said he was 
interested in analyzing the checkpoints through cost-effective lens. See Ortega, supra note 7. 
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immigrants apprehended at a checkpoint? Second, what is the annually 
recorded number of narcotics apprehended at a checkpoint? Third, what is 
the annually recorded number of unregistered firearms apprehended at a 
checkpoint? Fourth, what is the annually recorded number of human 
traffickers apprehended at a checkpoint? Fifth, what is the annually 
recorded number of miscellaneous unlawful activities prevented at a 
checkpoint? Finally, what is the annually recorded number of complaints 
filed against CBP agents at a checkpoint? The Ombudsman could utilize 
this cost-benefit tool every year and publish a report reflecting a three-year 
performance period.  
The Ombudsman’s role may not be difficult to implement. The 
Ombudsman could mimic the PHP Study and require that representatives 
physically monitor the checkpoints. One issue that could arise with this 
procedure is the distance the monitors are allowed to stand from CBP 
agents. Monitors should not interfere with a CBP agent’s duties; they 
should only observe what the agent is doing from a reasonable distance. 
Another way to track this data is to collect press releases CBP already 
publishes per checkpoint periodically.
205
 In addition to its reporting role, 
the Ombudsman can also serve an advisory role in assuring that CBP 
complies with the law. This includes the issuance of advisory opinions and 
legal memoranda on a periodic basis or, alternatively, upon request by 
CBP. These procedures do not intrude into CBP’s operations as much as a 
physical presence, and are exemplary examples of comity in practice 
between CBP and the Ombudsman. 
Finally, the Ombudsman would present his or her three-year report to 
CBP officials, DHS officials, and Congress to ultimately determine 
whether some checkpoints fare better than others.  
But the implementation of an Ombudsman may be unrealistic. 
According to Professor Stephen Legomsky, at the time House Bill 4303 
was proposed, it was “very unlikely” to pass congressional muster.206 
During the 113th Congress’s tenure, both House and Senate Republicans 
were “strongly opposed” to a provision that would have created an 
“Ombudsman for Immigration-Related Concerns.”207 The Ombudsman 
provision in Senate Bill 744 would have similarly contained various 
investigative, monitoring, and advisory functions concerning CBP 
 
 
 205. See generally Media Releases, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/ 
newsroom/media-releases/all (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).  
 206. E-mail from Stephen H. Legomsky, Law Professor, Washington Univ. Sch. of Law, to author 
(Feb. 5, 2015, 12:58 CST) (on file with author). 
 207. Id. (citing S. 744, § 1114, 113th Cong. (2013)). 
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operations.
208
 Contextually, a comprehensive immigration bill that 
includes dramatic increases in enforcement resources is unlikely to be 
favorable with Republicans.
209
 Currently, with a Republican-controlled 
Congress, and in a climate that has become even more hostile to 
immigrant-friendly legislation, “the chances of Congress enacting a law 
designed to monitor the operations of the immigration enforcement 
agencies have shrunk even further.”210 Republicans are unlikely to cut 
back on their tough stance on immigration enforcement, thus, House Bill 
4303 or a mirror image of the legislation is unlikely to be introduced in the 
114th Congress and even the 115th Congress if the Republicans continue 
to control the House and Senate. Such an anti-reformative view would 
only continue to make Republicans a less attractive party to Hispanic 
voters. Nonetheless, an Ombudsman may be part of a solution that would 
appear reasonable to both sides of the checkpoint debate.  
B. CBP Complaint Forum Proposal 
House Bill 4303 also provided protection to persons who are reluctant 
to file a complaint for fear of retaliatory actions by law enforcement 
officials.
211
 A similar concept should be implemented, especially if the 
Ombudsman’s office comes to fruition. A complaint mechanism would 
not use information the complainant alleges against a CBP agent in any 
removal or criminal proceeding against the complainant, even if the person 
violated US immigration laws.
212
 This provision could encourage potential 
complainants to come forward and report harassing and abusive CBP 
conduct.
213
 
Furthermore, as Professor Hing noted, due to the language barrier and 
inaccessible forum for making complaints,
214
 a new complaint mechanism 
through the Ombudsman should provide a multilingual complaint 
procedure that is accessible online
215
 and would be visible at interior 
 
 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. Border Enforcement Accountability, Oversight, and Community Engagement Act of 2014, 
H.R. 4303, § 452(f)(2), 113th Cong. (2014). 
 212. See id. An analogous provision in future proposals could prove problematic, especially for 
those already reluctant to place oversight on CBP. Opponents of the provision could argue that, for 
policy reasons, those who violate the law should not be allowed to go free.  
 213. Id. 
 214. See Hing, supra note 138, at 765–78.  
 215. H.R. 4303 § 452(d)(7)(C). CBP has “not adopted a consistent, uniform process for filing 
complaints, and do[es] not make complaint forms available in Spanish, such that many individuals do 
not submit formal abuse complaints.” LYALL ET AL., supra note 52, at 5, 16. The CBP Integrity 
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checkpoints.
216
 Any implemented complaint procedure should be 
externalized, not further internalized by CBP’s current bureaucracy. 
C. Community Sticker Program Proposal 
In addition to the previously discussed proposals set forth in House Bill 
4303, several supplemental proposals may address issues with the current 
procedures at checkpoints following Martinez-Fuerte. For instance, CBP 
could consider implementing a Community Sticker Program (“CSP”).217 
CSP could emulate CBP’s current “SENTRI” program implemented at 
international borders.
218
 “SENTRI provides expedited CBP processing for 
pre-approved, low-risk travelers. Applicants must voluntarily undergo a 
thorough biographical background check against criminal, law 
enforcement, customs, immigration, and terrorist indices; a 10-fingerprint 
law enforcement check; and a personal interview with a CBP Officer.”219 
Upon approval, individuals are issued Radio Frequency Identification 
(“RFID”) cards that identify their residency status on CBP’s database once 
at a port of entry.
220
 Through the RFID cards, “the system automatically 
identifies the vehicle and the identity of the occupants of the vehicle.”221 
Like SENTRI, CSP would require local residents to go through a 
screening process in order to qualify for admission to the program. Once 
admitted, residents would receive a blue sticker that must be placed on the 
windshield.
222
 The sticker would reflect the maximum number of people 
allowed in the vehicle, with each person individually registered in the CSP 
database. For instance, if the registrant initially registered his or her family 
of six, only six people could be in the car when arriving at the checkpoint. 
 
 
Advisory Panel recommended that CBP implement a fully-integrated Spanish language version of its 
complaints system. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT OF THE CBP 
INTEGRITY ADVISORY PANEL 4 (2015), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/DHS-HSAC-CBP-IAP-Interim-Report.pdf.  
 216. H.R. 4303 § 452(d)(7)(C). 
 217. A similar thought was raised at oral argument in Martinez-Fuerte. See Oral Argument at 
13:37, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (No. 74-1560), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1560. 
 218. Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., 
http://www.cbp.gov/travel/trusted-traveler-programs/sentri (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).  
 219. Id. SENTRI is unavailable to certain individuals, including, but not limited to, those who 
provide false or incomplete information during the screening process, those who have been convicted 
of a crime, and those who have violated US immigration laws. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Perhaps CBP could even consider using RFID cards at checkpoints. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/9
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If there were any more than that upon a plain view inspection, the point 
officer could then question the vehicle’s occupants.  
Another tier of CSP would be what Chief Justice Warren Burger 
posited at oral argument in Martinez-Fuerte.
223
 CBP agents at international 
border stations would place a bright orange sticker on cars crossing from 
abroad into the United States. CBP could mandate that the sticker remain 
on the car windshield for forty-eight hours. If a car arrives at the 
checkpoint with the bright orange sticker, agents would automatically refer 
the car to secondary for inspection. A car without a bright orange sticker 
or one with a blue sticker would not be subject to inspection.  
Obviously this program has its setbacks; it potentially opens the door to 
fraud—for example, removing the sticker and placing it on another 
person’s car or substituting legal residents for undocumented 
immigrants.
224
 Thus, CSP would make it easier for those individuals who 
are legally present in the country to transport undocumented immigrants 
since a CBP agent would not be required to question a vehicle in 
compliance with the blue sticker or a vehicle without a bright orange 
sticker on the windshield. Moreover, the sticker program could also make 
it much easier for individuals to smuggle narcotics and other illegal 
materials within the United States, again because a CBP agent would be 
unlikely to stop a vehicle in compliance with the blue sticker or one 
without a bright orange sticker.  
Individuals with a sticker on their car (whether blue or bright orange) 
can easily remove the sticker and bypass the checkpoint unless CBP 
designs a sticker or device that can only be removed by CBP. Any sign of 
tampering with the sticker or device (perhaps during an annual renewal of 
one’s CSP membership) would be suspect and cause CBP to launch an 
investigation into the matter. Thus, while certain defects in CSP could 
undermine the program altogether, CBP needs to close such gaps and 
make it clear that anyone who willfully circumvents the screening process 
or abuses the program shall be sanctioned.  
 
 
 223. See Oral Argument at 13:37, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (No. 74-
1560), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1560. 
 224. Non-fraudulent considerations would be transactional costs on CBP for producing the 
stickers and for ordering agents on duty at the international border to place the stickers on the large 
volume of cars coming from Mexico and Canada.  
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D. A Supreme Court Fix? 
The final solution to the checkpoint conundrum hails from the 
judiciary. A Supreme Court fix may perhaps be what clarifies the 
underlying role checkpoints play within the United States. In order to 
avoid the trap the Martinez-Fuerte defendants fell into, a future litigant 
before the Supreme Court should not engage in unlawful activities, such as 
transporting undocumented immigrants or narcotics. The Martinez-Fuerte 
defendants engaged in such unlawful activities and thus the justices were 
not persuaded by their arguments. 
The Supreme Court recently avoided addressing the complexities of the 
checkpoint operations. In March 2010, Richard Rynearson, a major in the 
United States Air Force, was stopped at a checkpoint in Uvalde County, 
Texas.
225
 When Mr. Rynearson arrived at the checkpoint, the point officer 
asked if he owned the vehicle he was driving.
226
 Answering in the 
affirmative, the point officer referred Mr. Rynearson to secondary.
227
 No 
CBP agent had inquired about Mr. Rynearson’s citizenship.228 At 
secondary, Mr. Rynearson refused to completely open his car window.
229
 
CBP agents later requested that Mr. Rynearson provide identification.
230
 
Mr. Rynearson complied, placing his driver’s license and military 
identification between the window glass and the door’s weather stripping, 
which allowed CBP agents to reasonably read from the outside of the 
vehicle.
231
  
Thereafter, a CBP agent asked Mr. Rynearson to step out of his car.
232
 
Mr. Rynearson refused and asked why he was being detained.
233
 The CBP 
agent responded that he intended to determine Mr. Rynearson’s citizenship 
and that he would be free to go thereafter.
234
 Mr. Rynearson continued to 
refuse, requesting that the agent explain what his “reasonable suspicion” 
was, to no avail.
235
 The CBP agent stepped away to find a supervisor, 
while Mr. Rynearson added his passport to the window glass along with 
 
 
 225. Rynearson v. United States, 601 F. App’x 302, 302–04 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2016) (No. 15-168). 
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his driver’s license and military identification.236 Later, another CBP agent 
asked Mr. Rynearson for his passport and the name of his commanding 
officer; Mr. Rynearson refused to furnish his commanding officer’s 
identification.
237
 Thereafter, the CBP agent took Mr. Rynearson’s 
passport, verified his citizenship, and allowed him to leave.
238
 Mr. 
Rynearson’s total time at the checkpoint was approximately thirty-four 
minutes.
239
  
Following the incident, Mr. Rynearson filed an administrative claim 
with the border patrol in accordance with the FTCA, seeking $500,000 in 
damages arising out of the checkpoint stop.
240
 The border patrol denied his 
claim,
241
 and he filed an action in federal district court.
242
 Mr. Rynearson’s 
complaint alleged negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and several violations of Mr. Rynearson’s 
constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.
243
 Mr. Rynearson’s complaint also requested Bivens relief 
from the agents, in their individual capacities, for a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights.
244
 Mr. Rynearson’s claims were dismissed at the 
district court level, and no appeal was taken thereafter.
245
 The district court 
ruled, among other things, that the CBP agents were entitled to qualified 
immunity.
246
 The Fifth Circuit only reviewed Mr. Rynearson’s Bivens 
actions arising out of the Fourth Amendment.
247
  
After reviewing his appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, 
and held that Mr. Rynearson did not have a “clearly established” right, 
under the Fourth Amendment, to refuse to cooperate with CBP agents at a 
checkpoint.
248
 The Fifth Circuit noted that a “routine interior immigration 
checkpoint stop conducted without reasonable suspicion does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.”249 Moreover, “[b]order patrol agents at interior 
checkpoints may stop a vehicle, refer it to a secondary inspection area, 
request production of documents from the vehicle’s occupants, and 
 
 
 236. Id. 
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 240. Id. 
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 248.  Id. at 305–06. 
 249. Id. at 304 (citing United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561–62 (1976)). 
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question the occupants about their citizenship.”250 The Court noted that the 
CBP agents did not violate Mr. Rynearson’s constitutionals rights, but 
rather “made reasonable but mistaken judgments when presented with an 
unusually uncooperative person, unusual at least in the facts described in 
any of the caselaw.”251 The court did not consider whether Mr. Rynearson 
could refuse to cooperate with CBP due to his Fourth Amendment 
protections.
252
 Rather, the court ruled that the CBP agents were entitled to 
qualified immunity against Mr. Rynearson’s claims because “no 
constitutional right of which all reasonable officers would have known 
was violated.”253  
Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod, however, disagreed with the majority. In 
her dissenting opinion, she noted that the “clearly established” law the 
CBP agents violated was the “Fourth Amendment when they . . . 
detain[ed] [Mr. Rynearson] beyond the time reasonably necessary to 
investigate his citizenship status.”254 After a denial of rehearing en banc, 
Mr. Rynearson petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a 
writ of certiorari.
255
 On March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court denied his 
petition.  
While Rynearson was the closest case to address the Martinez-Fuerte 
conundrum, a future case may go much farther than Rynearson would 
have. Surely, in Rynearson, the discussion would have focused on whether 
the checkpoints are still limited to the Martinez-Fuerte framework (i.e., to 
be used solely for immigration inquiries, as opposed to broader law 
enforcement practices). Rynearson, however, would have not addressed 
the constitutionality of the “Mexican ancestry” criterion since Mr. 
Rynearson did not raise the issue on appeal, and even if he did, he would 
lack standing to do so since he is not of “Mexican ancestry.” The Supreme 
Court has not overruled Martinez-Fuerte, and thus the “Mexican ancestry” 
criterion remains valid. Someone other than Mr. Rynearson may challenge 
the criterion on equal protection grounds arising out of the Fifth 
Amendment.
256
 Such a challenge would allege that Hispanics are subject 
 
 
 250. Id. (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562–63). 
 251. Id. at 305. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 306 (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
 255. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rynearson v. Lands, No. 13-51114 (U.S. Aug. 3, 2015) 
(No. 15-168). 
 256. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs state action, not federal 
conduct by a federal agency like CBP. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that equal 
protection requirements apply to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment). 
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to abuse and harassment at the checkpoints at staggering rates while non-
Hispanics are not. An equal protection analysis would not look at the 
initial stop, because everyone is stopped. Rather, such an analysis would 
look at the secondary stop, which is much more selective given the 
“Mexican ancestry” criterion used in Martinez-Fuerte.  
The Court may be persuaded to grant certiorari in a future challenge to 
the checkpoint operations given the current circuit split over the scope and 
length of non-immigration related inquiries at checkpoints.
257
 Currently, 
three federal circuits with, presumably, the largest immigration dockets, 
all agree that once a checkpoint detention procedure exceeds the 
permissible immigration inquiry per Martinez-Fuerte, further detention is 
justified only if CBP agents have developed a minimum level of 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
258
 The issue is at what point does 
detention at a checkpoint become impermissible. The circuits seem 
divided on whether CBP agents may convert an immigration-related 
inquiry into a non-immigration related inquiry, especially without a 
minimum level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
259
 Thus, if all 
else fails, a Supreme Court solution could solve the checkpoint conundrum 
by granting certiorari in a future challenge to the checkpoint operations in 
the interest of clarifying Martinez-Fuerte and its progeny. 
CONCLUSION 
Many Americans are unaware of the militaristic procedures that occur 
every day at CBP checkpoints within the United States. As previously 
mentioned, such procedures, along with the current status of the law, have 
left many questions unanswered, such as whether a functional equivalent 
to an international border operates differently than the international border 
itself. Administrative reform, congressional reform, and a future ruling by 
the Supreme Court could all resolve these unanswered questions. Such 
reforms should take effect in that order. The checkpoint problem is not just 
 
 
 257. See S. Ct. R. 10(a) (noting that the Court may grant certiorari when “a United States court of 
appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on 
the same important matter”).  
 258. See, e.g., United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 434 (5th Cir. 2001); United States 
v. Massie, 65 F.3d 843, 848 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Taylor, 934 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 
1991).  
     259. See, e.g., Rynearson, 601 F. App’x at 302–04 (allowing CBP agents to inquire into matters 
unrelated to immigration enforcement); United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 
1993) (holding that brief inquiries into limited matters such as vehicle ownership must be “reasonably 
related” to immigration enforcement); Taylor, 934 F.2d at 220 (allowing brief inquiries into 
immigration-related matters and allowing for plain view inspections of vehicles). 
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a southwestern issue, but an American issue, because innocent, law-
abiding citizens’ constitutional rights are being undermined within US 
borders. 
But completely banning checkpoints from the United States should be 
off the table. An open border system, like that in the Schengen Area of 
Europe,
260
 carries a tremendous risk to national security. Rather, the 
federal government must continue to recognize the utility of operating 
checkpoints while simultaneously recognizing that the checkpoints now 
advance much broader interests. In 1976, checkpoints were designed to 
solely curtail the flow of undocumented immigration from Mexico, but 
now counterterrorism and drug-trafficking prevention are cognizable law 
enforcement functions. Threats to national security no longer solely come 
from abroad; they may also come from within the United States. The 
bottom line is that the federal government needs more information, and it 
can obtain that information by implementing a cost-benefit analysis of 
checkpoint procedures on a national scale. While this empirical research is 
being conducted, judicial grievances should not be ignored, but such 
grievances are merely a Band-Aid to the more inherent issue of whether 
all checkpoints are being used effectively without substantially infringing 
on the constitutional rights of many. The courts may be called upon to 
determine whether checkpoints are still being operated within the scope of 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Martinez-Fuerte. If they are not being 
operated within the scope of Martinez-Fuerte, and given the various 
interests at play, should the Martinez-Fuerte scope be broadened to cover 
those interests, and if so, who should broaden that scope: Congress, CBP, 
or the courts?  
While the Southwest presently serves as the focal point for these 
procedures, one can only speculate how far the federal government will 
expand these checkpoint operations while the federal judiciary 
continuously defers to CBP’s discretion. While CBP checkpoints have 
served, and will probably continue to serve, a compelling government 
interest by preventing the transportation of drugs, undocumented 
immigrants, and firearms, the effectiveness of each individual checkpoint 
 
 
 260. See Josh Lew, EU Sets Deadline for Border Patrol Plan, TRAVEL PULSE (Dec. 18, 2015, 
2:51 PM), http://www.travelpulse.com/news/impacting-travel/eu-sets-deadline-for-border-patrol-
plan.html; cf. Migrant Crisis: Sweden Border Checks Come into Force, BBC (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35218921. 
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ought to be scrutinized in order to preserve fundamental constitutional 
rights where they presumably are applied in the highest regard: within the 
United States.  
Jesus A. Osete

 
 
  J.D. (2016), Washington University in St. Louis; A.B. (2013), University of Arizona. My 
sincerest gratitude goes out to my colleagues at the Washington University Law Review. At the apex of 
that pool of talent, my gratitude particularly goes to Tessa Castner, Alec Moen, Jonathan Adair, Colin 
Stapleton, John Gauthier, Jenny Terrell, Taylor Widawski, Galen Spielman, and Kam Ammari. 
Moreover, I thank Professor Stephen Legomsky for his contributions to this Note (happy retirement!). 
Finalmente, le doy gracias a Dios por bendecirme con tantas oportunidades y a mi familia por 
apoyarme.  
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
